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Damian Park 
CALIFORNIA WATER REALLOCATION: 
WHERE’D YOU GET THAT? 
ABSTRACT 
When thirsty, Californians often avoid going to the market for 
more water. Instead, they might borrow some from their rich 
neighbors, they might sue them or more commonly, they simply 
take more from users without much of a voice (e.g. the fish or 
future generations). These alternatives are often superior to 
using markets. Within markets, a surprising detail emerges – it is 
uncommon for farmers to fallow fields in order to sell water to 
another user. Rather, many water transfers are structured so 
sellers can have their cake and eat it too. While some of these 
transfers rightly bring about jealousy and criticism, they likely do 
facilitate efficient water use. In discussing these points, I provide 
a more holistic description of how water users reallocate water 
as well as a richer understanding of how California’s water 
market actually works. 
INTRODUCTION 
California’s exploding population—quintupling since the late 1940s—led 
economists to call for water transfers from agriculture to urban uses as a preferable 
way to accommodate the increased growth compared to costly new water supply 
projects. The calls fell on stubborn ears. During the 1950s, the state engaged in an 
elaborate planning exercise to engineer a massive expansion in the state’s water 
supply, including both the creation of a new State Water Project (SWP) and a 
significant expansion of the federal Central Valley Project (CVP). Today, 
agriculture still uses close to 80% of the developed water supply,1 representing a 
potential, albeit controversial, source of supply for accommodating new demand. 
Although water transfers were essentially invisible from the water policy arena 
until well into the 1980s, they have become more prevalent since the mid-1990s.2 
 
 Damian Park is an adjunct lecturer in the Economics Department at Santa Clara University. He 
holds a BA in Economics from Carleton College and a PhD in Agriculture and Resource Economics 
from UC Berkeley. This work is an offshoot of my dissertation, DAMIAN BLASE BICKETT, EVOLUTION 
OF WATER MARKETING IN CALIFORNIA: FORMAL VS. INFORMAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2011), 
http://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Bickett_berkeley_0028E_11983.pdf. 
 1. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE 2009, http://www.water.ca.
gov/waterplan/docs/technical/cwpu2013/PA_13_year_balances_2-12-15.xlsm [https://perma.cc/JCC5-
JP7H]. The state-wide average net water use for 1998–2010 for total urban use was 6.3 million acre-feet 
while the state-wide average net water use for total agricultural use was 25.9 million acre feet. See id. 
 2. See ELLEN HANAK, WHO SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SELL WATER IN CALIFORNIA? vi (2003). 
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To appreciate California’s historical and present water transfer system, it is useful 
to understand how users reallocate water outside of markets. In addition, the 
institutional background adds context to the reallocation story and also helps 
explain the types of trading that have occurred in California as well as those 
transfers that failed. 
It is tempting to focus solely on water market data to understand water 
trading. But water is not a commodity like pork bellies—rather, each acre-foot 
traded differs in water quality, relevant habitat concerns, delivery schedule, etc. 
Water trading can be more like an act of diplomacy than a simple purchase. Thus 
condensing a transaction into its length, quantity of water, and trader identities 
leaves out important information. In addition, because of the fluidity of reallocation 
methods, even defining a transfer is imprecise. Therefore, market data alone will 
provide an incomplete and biased picture. 
For the transfers that do occur, identifying the opportunity cost of 
transferred water provides fascinating insight. In other words, if users have water to 
transfer, who would use the water if it weren’t sold? The answer to this question is 
surprising, and illustrates what I will call the Rule of Fallowed Fields: there may be 
many reasons why a particular field is fallow, but water markets aren’t one. It 
remains quite difficult to permanently fallow productive land in order to free up 
water. 
My contribution to the literature is a holistic description of how water 
users reallocate water as well as a richer understanding of how Californians 
actually facilitate water transfers. Put simply, if someone acquires new water, it’s 
quite useful to ask, “Where’d you get that?” 
I. WHAT IS A TRANSFER? 
Defining a “water transfer” is a necessary first step for discussing water 
reallocation. According to a more formal definition, “a water transfer involves a 
change in the place of use, point of diversion, or purpose of use to a new location 
either within or outside the watershed.”3 According to a less formal definition, “a 
water transfer is a change in the way water is usually allocated among water 
users.”4 These definitions are a good starting point, but more precision is useful 
because some reallocations that fit this definition are not typically considered 
transfers. Irrigation district annexations and increased water withdrawals are 
examples, and I discuss these common non-market methods of reallocation first. 
 
 3. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., WATER TRANSFERS AND THE DELTA PLAN 2 (2015), 
http://www.water.ca.gov/watertransfers/docs/Water_Transfers_Report_to_DSC.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CN5L-YHNJ]. 
 4. CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., A GUIDE TO WATER TRANSFERS 11 (1999), 
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/water_transfers/docs/watertransfergu
ide.pdf [https://perma.cc/D85Y-JGSY]. 
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A. Nonmarket Methods of Reallocation and Acquisition 
1. Just Take It 
In California, landowners may extract groundwater for use on their land 
almost without limit.5 This fact, when coupled with the loosely regulated surface 
water rights system,6 discourages formal water acquisition from other users. 
Without groundwater rights that limit extraction, a growing city reliant on 
groundwater may simply take more groundwater from existing wells, or they may 
buy new land that has a better groundwater supply, as the town of Pixley (between 
Fresno and Bakersfield) is considering.7 
Urban users reliant on surface water rights often simply take more water 
as well. For post-1914 appropriative water rights, the State Water Resources 
Control Board (SWRCB) grants applicants at least ten years to fully use the amount 
specified in the water right application and can grant additional extensions.8 East 
Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD) (the urban Berkeley/Oakland provider), 
for example, applied for permit 10478 in 1956 to store water from the Mokelumne 
River in the Pardee and Camanche Rivers. They were given until 2000 to 
beneficially use the amount of water specified in the application. However, in late 
2000, EBMUD filed for a 40-year extension,9 and the SWRCB waited until 2007 to 
publicize EBMUD’s petition for extension and has not actually acted upon it as of 
this writing.10 Therefore, EBMUD has a significant amount of surface water 
 
 5. See JOSEPH L. SAX, STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BOARD REVIEW OF THE LAWS 
ESTABLISHING THE SWRCB’S PERMITTING AUTHORITY OVER APPROPRIATIONS OF GROUNDWATER 
CLASSIFIED AS SUBTERRANEAN STREAMS AND THE SWRCB’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE LAWS 
3637 (2002) (noting Representative Short’s legal argument for Assembly Bill No. 642 made no 
assertion that there was a regulatory authority over non-overlying issues of groundwater). 
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/hearings/groundwater_classification/
docs/substreamrpt2002jan20.pdf [https://perma.cc/HYE9-TW8T]. 
 6. See MICHAEL HANEMANN ET AL., CLIMATE VULNERABILITY AND ADAPTATION STUDY FOR 
CALIFORNIA: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF BARRIERS TO ADAPTATION FOR CALIFORNIA’S WATER SECTOR 2 
(2012). California recognizes both riparian and appropriative rights to surface water. Appropriative 
rights acquired before 1914 are outside of the regulatory scope of the State Water Resources Control 
Board, the governing body that manages the post-1914 system. Groundwater rights are correlative 
except for those in adjudicated basins. The SWP and CVP are very large junior appropriators, and thus 
there is typically plenty of water for non-CVP and non-SWP users. Therefore, the state does not need to 
enforce water right priorities, which means that water rights are not really quantified. The looseness of 
the system is compounded by pre-1914 water rights that are not controlled by the SWRCB and 
correlative groundwater and riparian water rights. 
 7. Brian Maxey, Pixley Looks Toward Tulare School-Owned Land for Water, VISALIA TIMES-
DELTA, Nov. 20, 2012, at C1, http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/visaliatimesdelta/access/2819615981.html
?FMT=ABS&date=Nov+20% 2C+2012 [https://perma.cc/DX4S-LELU]. 
 8. CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS—PERMIT TEAERMS 6 
(2001), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/permits/terms/license/license
_allterms.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZE2-JRMX]. 
 9. Petition for Extension of Time at 2, East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., Cal. Div. of Water Rights, 
Application No. 013156, (Nov. 27, 2000) (Permit No. 10478), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water
rights/water_issues/programs/applications/petitions/2007/13156_petition.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3W6-
9W5T]. 
 10. Notice of Petition for Time Extension at 2, East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., Cal. Div. of Water 
Rights, Application No. 013156, (Jan. 10, 2007) (Permit 10478), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water
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flexibility built into its “quantified” water right, and has little need to purchase 
additional water rights to accommodate growth.11 This example is not unique. 
Urban users reliant on pre-1914 appropriative surface water rights also 
have flexibility. San Francisco has pre-1914 water rights for the Hetch-Hetchy 
Reservoir on the Tuolumne River, and although the city uses at most 300 million 
gallons per day (mgd), they claim a right to 400 mgd despite having no current 
ability or need to divert that much water. Although disputed, the SWRCB appears 
to agree with them.12 Loosely quantified rights contributes to a murky water right 
system, and without a binding cap on diversions, market reallocation is less likely. 
2. Annexation 
Agricultural users acquire and reallocate water with similar methods, 
obviating the need to execute a formal transfer. Rather than sell water rights, many 
agricultural districts sell water directly to adjacent farmers if excess water is 
available.13 Over time, some of these districts expand their infrastructure and annex 
adjacent land into the district. Stockton-East Water District, for example, started 
with 114,500 acres,14 and now serves close to 143,300 acres after expansions in 
1971, 2004, and 2008.15 Agricultural districts also annex urban land, which is 
especially helpful to the city if the new surface supply augments contaminated 
urban groundwater. Stockton-East Water District is a prime example here as well, 
annexing the rest of the city of Stockton in 1971.16 If agricultural districts have 
large flexible water rights capable of serving new users, this will discourage 
adjacent users from seeking water transfers. 
Placer County Water Agency (PCWA) provides an interesting example. 
Their sale to Sacramento Suburban Water District (SSWD) (formerly Northridge 
Water District) looks like a water transfer, and it shows up in datasets on water 
marketing, but only because PCWA did not annex SSWD. PCWA did, however, 
 
rights/water_issues/programs/applications/petitions/2007/13156_notice.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PAT-
GMHT]. Telephone Interview with Kate Gaffney of the Permitting Section, State Water Res. Control 
Bd (2012) (mentioning the petition got lost in the shuffle, and regardless, is controversial and currently 
going through the CEQA process). 
 11. This is further evidence of the loosely regulated surface water rights. 
 12. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1416 (2011) (providing that cities do not have to build diversion works 
for future need, only immediate need). 
 13. See, e.g., OAKDALE IRRIGATION DIST. RULES AND REGULATIONS, § 5 (2016), 
http://www.oakdaleirrigation.com/sections/waterops/agwater/rules/5#o [https://perma.cc/N332-5423]; 
NEV. IRRIGATION DISTRICT, WATER SERVICE REGULATIONS: FORMS, FORM 5-E & FORM 5-G (2014), 
http://nidwater.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Water-Service-Rules-Regs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B7PS-4VVW]. 
 14. Order Revoking Permit to Appropriate Water, Stockton E. Water Dist., No. WR 80-17, at 2 
(State Water Res. Control Bd. Sept. 18, 1980) http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/board_
decisions/adopted_orders/orders/1980/wro80-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3P4-T3YU]. 
 15. STOCKTON E. WATER DIST., TIMELINE OF THE STOCKTON EAST WATER DISTRICT, at 2, 5, 6 
(2014), http://sewd.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Timeline2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/96TQ-2Y4B]. 
Other districts are similar. Oakdale Irrigation District is currently considering a 7,500 acre expansion to 
serve almond orchards. See John Holland, Oakdale Irrigation District Sets Talks on Water Sale Plan, 
MODESTO BEE, Aug. 26, 2012. 
 16. See History, STOCKTON E. WATER DIST., http://www.sewd.net/history [https://perma.cc/7ANU-
5JXA]. 
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expand the place of use of their water right to include SSWD,17 and so calling this a 
water transfer while not calling many other neighborly annexations or surplus 
water sales transfers is confusing. 
3. CVP Contracts 
The Central Valley Project, the largest water wholesaler in the state, 
created incentives to avoid market reallocation as well. Why acquire water through 
a transfer when a district could contract for reliable, subsidized water through the 
CVP instead? Agricultural regions sought contracts to deal with their groundwater 
overdraft,18 in effect acquiring unappropriated water from Northern California 
rather than reallocating from other users.19 This happened in the 1930s, the 1950s, 
and then again in the 1976–77 drought. New Melones Reservoir, the last CVP 
reservoir, was completed in 1978, and Stockton-East Water District and Central 
San Joaquin Water Conservation District only signed contracts in 1983. Not until 
the CVP stopped building did users begin to consider alternative sources of new 
supply.20 
4. Court Reallocations 
California courts provide additional non-transfer methods of reallocating 
water. In some cases, society accommodated new water users through the courts’ 
power to ensure existing water uses were reasonable and beneficial, a requirement 
for all water uses at the root of western water law.21 This concept is vague, and the 
courts can gradually restrict what they (and society) view as a reasonable or 
beneficial use so that water is used in the most productive way.22 Although 
California’s constitution was amended in 1928 to mandate reasonableness in all 
water uses, the idea was not new. It was evident in the famous 1855 decision which 
confirmed appropriation.23 
There are many examples of court reallocation, typically motivated by 
new users trying to convince courts or the legislature that older uses were 
 
 17. Telephone Interview with Robert Roscoe, General Manager, Sacramento Suburban Water Dist. 
(2010); See Order Approving Change in the Place of Use, and Amending the Permit, Placer Cty. Water 
Agency, No. Pet-Ord-Per (8-99) (State Water Res. Control Bd. May 24, 2000) (order approving change 
in the place of use), http://swrcb2.waterboards.ca.gov/ewrims/wrims-permits/p013856.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RG8Y-H28Q]. 
 18. See Barbara T. Andrews & Sally K. Fairfax, Groundwater and Intergovernmental Relations in 
the Southern San Joaquin Valley of California, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 145, 150 (1983). 
 19. Farmers adjacent to contracting districts sometimes experienced improved groundwater levels 
as a result, and thus happily supported importation. 
 20. The construction of new dams may only be on hold—many users want an enlarged San Luis 
and Shasta Dam as well as construction of Sites and Temperance Flat Reservoirs. 
 21. See SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES: THE LAW OF PRIOR 
APPROPRIATION OF WATER 504 (3rd ed. 1911). 
 22. Samantha K. Olson & Erin K.L. Mahaney, Searching for Certainty in a State of Flux: How 
Administrative Procedures Help Provide Stability in Water Rights Law, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 73, 87 
(2005). 
 23. See Brian E. Gray, “In search of Bigfoot”: The Common Law Origins of Article X, Section 2 of 
the California Constitution, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 225, 241 (1989) (discussing Irwin v. Phillips, 5 
Cal. 140 (Cal. 1855)). 
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anachronistic or wasteful.24 For example, before 1884, it was reasonable to blast 
water at hillsides to mine gold until farmers with flooded fields became angry 
enough to sue to stop the practice.25 This ruling was not made with the intent to 
reallocate water, but the decision essentially ended the practice of hydraulic 
mining,26 making water supplies available to others. Similarly, before 1935, 
farmers would irrigate in the winter to kill gophers, but in 1935, the California 
Supreme Court ruled that “It seems quite clear to us that in such an area of need as 
the Kaweah delta the use of an appreciable quantity of water for such a purpose 
(drowning and freezing squirrels and gophers) cannot be held to be a reasonable 
beneficial use.”27 In other words, when water is abundant, pest control was 
acceptable, but if other farmers need irrigation water, they are more deserving. 
Increasing environmental awareness also spurs reallocation. In 1940, the 
SWRCB approved, with reservation, Los Angeles’ initial diversions from the 
Mono Basin. But later, as a result of a lawsuit pursued by the National Audubon 
Society, the SWRCB deemed the diversions contrary to the public trust based on 
degradation of Mono Lake.28 The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
(LADWP) was then forced to reduce its diversions from the Owens Valley to 
accommodate this “new” environmental use. Before the 1987–92 drought, LADWP 
diverted close to 500,000 acre-feet per year from Owens Valley, but since the 1994 
ruling stipulating that they must decrease pumping to restore Mono Lake’s surface 
elevation, their average diversions have been closer to 300,000 acre-feet.29 
Therefore, the National Audubon Society achieved their environmental reallocation 
goal not through the market but through the courts. 
Environmental lawsuit-led reallocation occurs frequently, most recently in 
2013 when Klamath Riverkeeper and the Karuk Tribe sued and settled with a dam 
operator on the Shasta River, garnering additional dry-year flows in an effort to 
help endangered Coho Salmon.30 In 1980, Salton Sea flooding caused by excess 
irrigation runoff in the Imperial Irrigation District sparked a lawsuit that eventually 
led to a water reallocation to Metropolitan Water District in 1987.31 Imperial’s 
 
 24. Acquiring water by prescription in California is difficult. See Teressa. K. Lippert, People v. 
Shirokow: Abolishing Prescriptive Water Rights Against the State, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1204, 1204 (1981). 
 25. See Woodruff v. N. Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) 
 26. NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER 79 (rev. ed. 2001). 
 27. Tulare Dist. v. Lindsay–Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal.2d 489, 568, 45 P.2d 972 (Cal. 1935). 
 28. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 71112 (Cal. 1983). 
 29. See L.A. DEP’T WATER & POWER, ANNUAL OWENS VALLEY REPORT 232 (2010). 
 30. Dan Bacher, Karuk Tribe and Klamath Riverkeeper Settle ESA Suit with Montague Water 
Conservation District, DAILY KOS (Dec. 23, 2013, 11:41 AM MST), http://www.dailykos.com/story/
2013/12/23/1264899/-Karuk-Tribe-and-Klamath-Riverkeeper-Settle-ESA-Suit-with-Montague-Water-
Conservation-District [https://perma.cc/JZA7-XPS3]; David Smith, Riverkeeper and Karuk Tribe Settle 
Suit Against Montague Water Conservation District, SISKIYOU DAILY NEWS, YREKA, (Dec. 24, 2013, 
8:42 AM), http://www.siskiyoudaily.com/article/20131224/NEWS/131229928/-1/obituaries. 
 31. The original complaint was from a landowner on the shore of the Sea. See Elmore v. Imperial 
Irrigation Dist., 159 Cal. App. 3d 185 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1984). For a description of the 
transfer, see BRENT. M. HADDAD, RIVERS OF GOLD: DESIGNING MARKETS TO ALLOCATE WATER IN 
CALIFORNIA 74 (2000); HUNDLEY, supra note 26, at 470; COMM. ON WESTERN WATER MGMT., NAT’L 
RES. COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 234 
(1992). 
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transfer was the first large agricultural to urban transfer, but it was more akin to a 
shotgun marriage than one of voluntary reallocation.32 
It is difficult to attach numbers to the methods described above,33 but such 
methods are common and occasionally reallocate a lot of water. Furthermore, 
because they are common, users are aware that the market may not be the best way 
to procure new water supplies.34 
B. Market Reallocation – Water Transfers 
Buying and selling water in markets can also be an attractive way to 
reallocate water. Water markets typically get more attention in the economic 
literature, so I spend some time discussing water market data and what we can 
learn from it. I also return to the institutional factors that shape the market, and 
discuss a surprising fact about how Californians reallocate water through the 
market. 
1. Water Market Data 
No single entity tracks and records water transfer data. In addition, the 
difficulty of tracking and recording water transfer data is exacerbated because 
transfers occur in “a bewildering variety of ways.”35 Notwithstanding these 
obstacles, most significant transfers are recorded and published. First, the State 
Water Resources Control Board monitors all changes in surface water rights 
granted after 1914, and publishes data on any transfers under those rights. Second, 
the two large government water projects, CVP and SWP, control key infrastructure 
that is often used to facilitate a transfer, and their decision to use that infrastructure 
triggers California Environmental Quality Act and the National Environmental 
Policy Act (CEQA/NEPA) compliance and the associated written documentation.36 
Finally, although pre-1914 water right transfers are exempt from SWRCB 
jurisdiction, transfers are “projects” carried out by local government agencies, and 
 
 32. HADDAD, supra note 31, at 63. 
 33. See CENTER FOR IRRIGATION TECHNOLOGY, AGRICULTURAL WATER USE IN CALIFORNIA 2011 
UPDATE 33 (2011) (attempting to quantify these environmental reallocations during the 1994─2009 
period), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/hearings/cachuma/exbhts_
2012feir/cachuma_feir_mu289.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QL4-HSMQ]. See also Water Transfer 
Facilitation Act of 2009; Hearing on S-1759 Before the Subcomm. on Water and Power of the S. Comm. 
Energy and Natural Resources, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Martin McIntyre, General Manager, 
San Luis Water on the Central Valley Project), http://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/
serve?File_id=c5eb36eb-c21c-2bbf-2d04-ffde227fd3d0 [https://perma.cc/W58A-WY4Q]. 
 34. Especially if the courts force the defendant to pay plaintiff attorney fees, which happened in the 
Shasta River—Klamath Riverkeeper—Karuk Tribe case. See Smith, supra note 30. 
 35. Morris Israel & Jay R. Lund, Recent California Water Transfers: Implications for Water 
Management, 35 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 1, 17 (1995). 
 36. NEPA compliance requires an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or, if the action is not 
likely to cause significant environmental impact, a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI). CEQA 
requires an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) or, if impacts are not significant, a Negative Declaration 
of significant impact. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, National Environmental Policy Act 
Review Process (2016) https://www.epa.gov/nepa/national-environmental-policy-act-review-process 
[https://perma.cc/995K-B3DL]. 
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hence also trigger compliance with CEQA and generate a written record.37 Smaller 
internal markets38 and intra-district transfers are not recorded with regularity, and 
while important,39 many agricultural water districts do not even grant their farmers 
transferable rights.40 To summarize, if a user transfers water to another user in 
another water district, a record likely exists. 
Many empirical California water market papers used data collected from 
the Water Strategist, a discontinued trade publication that recorded many western 
water transfers from 1987 until 2010.41 The publication called itself “the premier 
publication on water marketing and water policy issues in the 17 western states.”42 
This led some to justify its use on grounds that it was “the only source of published 
information on water transactions in the West,”43 or because “it is the only 
comprehensive source of water trade information.”44 But the Water Strategist was 
not comprehensive.45 The data it collected missed certain transactions and was 
 
 37. For more on CEQA and NEPA, see OFF. OF NEPA POL’Y AND COMPLIANCE, DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, NEPA AND CEQA: INTEGRATING FEDERAL AND STATE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS (2014), 
http://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2014/03/f9/NEPA_CEQA_FinalHandbook_February2014_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9JPG-M9LW]. 
 38. Solano County Water Agency is one prime example of missing data. 
 39. Just as a parent allocates food to children without resorting to prices and markets, a general 
manager may have enough knowledge to allocate water based on different member needs without 
resorting to markets. Many districts have methods to spread water around to their less fortunate users 
(typically meaning those without (good) groundwater), although they refrain from using a market. The 
benefits of markets are that they reveal information and bring buyers and sellers together, facilitating 
mutually beneficial trades. However, within small districts, where the general manager is familiar with 
crop needs and his members’ alternative water supplies, he likely can achieve some of the efficiency 
gains that an internal market reallocation would produce without using price incentives. This may be 
somewhat unique to water provision, where sharing in times of scarcity rather than selling for a market 
price still prevails in many areas. In these cases, a district may encourage (financially or otherwise) a 
user with good groundwater to pump all his supply and release that surface water for other users, 
spreading the pain around. This is crucial because while many users have groundwater, not all do (close 
to 60% of irrigated farms in CA have access to groundwater). 
 40. There are a few districts that stand out with active internal markets (Westlands WD, Arvin-
Edison WSD, Berrenda Mesa WD), but others I talked to also allow internal marketing. 
 41. Mariella Czetwertynski, The Sale and Leasing of Water Rights in Western States: An Overview 
for The Period 1990–2001, at 2 (Andrew Young School of Pol’y Studies, Water Pol’y Working Paper 
2002–002, 2002); Jedidiah Brewer et al., Water Markets and Legal Change in California, 1987–2005, 
26 WASH. UNIV. J. LAW POL’Y 183 (2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1079685 [https://perma.cc/P8DD-DD2L]; J. Brewer et al., Law and the New Institutional Economics: 
Water Markets in the West: Prices, Trading, and Contractual Forms, 46 ECON. INQUIRY 91–112 (2008); 
J. Brewer et al., 2006 Presidential Address Transferring Water in the American West: 1987–2005, 40 U. 
MICH. J.L. REFORM 1021 (2007); Thomas C. Brown, Trends in Water Market Activity and Price in the 
Western United States, 42 WATER RES. RES. 9402 (2006); HANAK, supra note 2; Richard Howitt & 
Kristiana Hansen, The Evolving Western Water Markets, 20 CHOICES 1, 59 (2005) (note that Hanak does 
not solely rely on their data). 
 42. What Happened to Water Strategist? STRATECON, http://www.stratwater.com/what-happened-
to-water-strategist/ [https://perma.cc/JZ5H-R8PP]. 
 43. J. Brewer et al., Transferring Water in the American West: 1987–2005, 40 U. MICH J.L. 
REFORM 1021 (2007) (citing Water Strategist). 
 44. Howitt & Hansen, supra note 41, at 61. 
 45. The Water Strategist never claimed to be comprehensive either–a current goal in their new 
publication, the Journal of Water, is to provide “extensive discussion and analysis of groundbreaking 
transactions that are unusually significant or conducted in circumstances that offer important lessons in 
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inconsistent across time. Some papers that use the publication gather the data from 
its summaries, but do not go back to check on actual delivered quantities or start 
dates. Thus, the datasets used often contain inaccurate quantities. Listed below are 
frequently found problems with the data. 
 
 Missing transactions: 
o Some published transactions in Colorado and along the Rio 
Grande46 
o Many intra-CVP/SWP transactions 
o All intra-district and adjacent landowner water sales 
 Inconsistent coverage 
o Adjudicated groundwater transfers appear consistently after 2000 
or so, but these deals occurred with regularity before then.47 
 Inaccurate quantities 
o Rusty Areias’ deal with MWD was included in the dataset, but it 
never happened.48 
o The IID-SDCWA transfer proposal occurred in 1996, but water 
did not flow until 2003. 
o Environmental transfers among the San Joaquin River Group 
Authority have occasionally been much smaller than actually 
planned. 
 
Not all academic papers are subject to these problems. Hanak does a 
fantastic job fixing many of these problems49 and creating a more comprehensive 
dataset for California. The following table summarizes the different water transfer 
types that are possible—the shaded boxes are the focus of her work: 
  
 
understanding the trading of water.” See STRATECON INC., JOURNAL OF WATER, http://journalofwater.
com/jow/trading-water/ [https://perma.cc/LS55-YKXF]. 
 46. Brown, supra note 41. 
 47. HADDAD, supra note 31, at 50; CAL. DEP’T. WATER RES., THE 1976–1977 CALIFORNIA 
DROUGHT: A REVIEW 116 (1978), http://www.water.ca.gov/watertransfers/docs/9_drought-1976-77.pdf. 
 48. Rodney Smith, First Long-Term CVPIA Water Transfer Approved, WATER INTELLIGENCE 
MONTHLY, Dec. 1995, at 4. 
 49. HANAK, supra note 2; ELLEN HANAK & ELIZABETH STRYJEWSKI, CALIFORNIA’S WATER 
MARKET, BY THE NUMBERS: UPDATE 2012 (Public Policy Inst. Calif. ed., 2012), http://www.ppic.org/
content/pubs/report/R_1112EHR.pdf [https://perma.cc/UV8J-NRN4]. 
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Table 1. Summary of water transfer types in California. 
  
Water Right 
Type Common Example Written Record? 
Surface Water Appropriative 
(post-1914) 
Yuba County Water Agency 
to Contra Costa WD (2003) 
SWRCB publishes records of 
all post-1914 water right 
transfers 
Appropriative 
(pre-1914) 
Oakdale ID to Stockton-East 
WD (1999) 
CEQA and the EIR process 
often create a written record 
Riparian Riparians in the Delta 
abstained from exercising 
their rights, “transferring” 
them to others during the 
1991 Drought Bank 
Requires state coordination 
CEQA and the EIR process 
create a written record 
District 
Contract 
Pixley to Westland WD 
(2007) 
Yes, if wholesaler is large 
(CVP, SWP) 
  
Individual 
Contract 
Ongoing internal Westlands 
WD transfers 
UC Berkeley study captured 
mid-1990s transfersa;  Arvin-
Edison WSD  and others may 
recordb 
Groundwater Adjudicated Ongoing San Gabriel Basin 
transfersc 
Annual watermaster reports 
often record this information 
  
Correlative Panoche WD to Eagle Field 
WD (1991)d 
Groundwater transfer 
agreements require canals, and 
if government owned, triggers 
an EIR/EIS 
 
Sources: ELLEN HANAK, WHO SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SELL WATER IN CALIFORNIA? (2003), ELLEN HANAK & 
ELIZABETH STRYJEWSKI, CALIFORNIA’S WATER MARKET, BY THE NUMBERS: UPDATE 2012 (Public Policy Inst. 
Calif. ed., 2012) (shaded boxes). 
a N. Brozovic, J. M. Carey & D. L. Sunding, Trading Activity in an Informal Agricultural Water Market: An Example From 
California, 121 WATER RESOURCES UPDATE 3–16 (2002).  
b R.W. Wahl, Market Transfers of Water in California, 1 WEST–NORTHWEST 49, 138 (1994). 
c MAIN SAN GABRIEL BASIN WATERMASTER, MAIN SAN GABRIEL BASIN: ANNUAL REPORT 89 (2014), 
http://media.wix.com/ugd/af1ff8_1d30b7f8d78e4e74878789c229b343e9.pdf [https://perma.cc/48ZP-M3Q2]. 
d Rodney Smith, First Long-Term CVPIA Water Transfer Approved, WATER INTELLIGENCE MONTHLY, Nov. 1991. 
 
With this dataset in hand,50 I present some transaction trends, although 
unlike the table above, I break transfers down into their ease and length. 
2. Transfer Categories 
There is an important distinction between the right to divert surface water 
from a stream or river versus the right to receive water that a user might have as a 
member of an irrigation district, for example, or as a contractor with the CVP or the 
SWP.51 The former is a water right, and the latter a water contract. Both are 
 
 50. The dataset was also supplemented with more historical CVP data from Bob Fournier (Bureau 
of Reclamation, Mid-Pacific Region) and Bulletin 132 for more SWP data available at 
http://www.water.ca.gov/swpao/bulletin_home.cfm [https://perma.cc/5MQ5-ZDE3]. 
 51. Groundwater transfers in adjudicated basins have been common since the 1960s but are not the 
focus of this paper. See HADDAD, supra note 31, at 50. 
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transferable, and much of California’s transfer activity occurs among contractors 
that use water under the same large water right,52 as the following discussion about 
transfer categories shows. 
Most analysts distinguish between short-term and long-term/permanent 
transfers, but in California, the diversity of types of short-term leases necessitates 
more categories. The common view of short-term transfers (often called leases or 
spot market transfers) is that they occur because of opposition to long-term deals, 
or because buyers do not need the water every year. In other words, temporary 
transfers are common because: 
[t]emporary transfers of one year or less face significantly fewer 
environmental regulations, the costs of defining rights 
sufficiently to sell them permanently are often prohibitive, and 
the presence of sufficient supply in wet years makes permanent 
transfers unnecessary and costly in many cases.53 
In reality, there are many factors that lead to a either short-term or long-
term transfer, but identifying them as such is practically impossible without asking 
each water user. Still, progress may be made by adding more meaningful categories 
to the data. First, recurring short-term transfers that likely substitute for a long-term 
transfer should be identified. These deals show up as short-term transfers, but occur 
practically every year and thus are not dependent on annual conditions. There is 
still a large diversity within the remaining short-term transfers, so I split them by 
their location—those that occur within the same water right and network are swaps, 
and the rest are simply short-term transfers.54 I explain each category in more detail 
next. 
a. Short-Term 
Transfers for one year or less are considered short-term transfers. For 
example, Metropolitan Water District in 2003 solidified an option agreement with 
Sacramento Valley rice growers. It received approval from the SWRCB for 
temporary rice-fallowing transfers of up to 80,000 acre-feet from eight Sacramento 
districts.55 These transfers typically involve a market price for water. 
 
 52. Although individuals use water, my unit of analysis is the water district. I use the term loosely 
to mean “any district or other political subdivision, other than a city or county, a primary function of 
which is the irrigation, reclamation, or drainage of land or the diversion, storage, management, or 
distribution of water primarily for domestic, municipal, agricultural, industrial, recreation, fish and 
wildlife enhancement, flood control, or power production purposes.” See CALIFORNIA WATER CODE, § 
20200 (2007). 
 53. Howitt & Hansen, supra note 41, at 62. 
 54. Storage capacity constraints may encourage transfers to avoid losses. In addition, landowners 
that own land in two different districts may “transfer” water from one district to another, but in reality 
there is only one using party. Furthermore, users often exchange water to smooth out supply, but may do 
so in ways which the Bureau of Reclamation doesn’t classify as an exchange because of differences in 
timing. All of these deals occur within a user’s network, and are classified as a swap. 
 55. MWD exercised its options on February 15th, but by April, the SWP Allocation had increased 
to 90%, making it impossible to deliver the water because their Table A deliveries took priority. The 
water was partially lost into the Pacific Ocean, and the remaining 47,124 acre-feet was stored in Shasta, 
where it remains until the unlikely possibility that the stars align and conditions allow fulfillment of the 
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b. Short-Term—Swaps 
Swaps are a subset of short-term transfers that take place within the same 
water right or network and are possible to transact without substantive third-party 
review.56 Like borrowing sugar from your neighbor, where the neighbor typically 
never asks to be compensated for the market value of the sugar, water districts 
swapping water often do the same. This category is primarily comprised of CVP-
internal and SWP-internal transfers. The vast majority of these trades occur 
between agricultural users. For example, in 1999, Madera Irrigation District 
purchased 1,100 acre-feet from three nearby irrigation districts. All were CVP 
contractors connected to Millerton Lake on the San Joaquin River. The irrigation 
districts sold the water left over from the previous year because of the threat that 
their reservoir would spill their water.57 
c. Long-Term/Permanent 
This category includes long-term leases (over five years) and permanent 
water right sales and contract assignments. In California, this category is primarily 
contract assignments within the CVP and SWP (e.g., Broadview WD selling its 
27,000 acre-feet CVP contract to Westlands WD in 2006). Except in unique 
circumstances,58 these trades probably occur at market prices. 
d. Long-Term/Substitute 
Short-term transfers that do not actually serve a short-term purpose 
necessitate a fourth category. Some districts trade frequently with the same buyers, 
in effect consummating a long-term transfer through a series of short-term deals. 
For example, Glide WD frequently purchases about 2,300 acre-feet per year from 
nearby Kanawha WD in northern California. In addition, until recently, the 
California Department of Water Resources and the Bureau of Reclamation 
purchased environmental water on an annual basis, usually from the same sellers. 
Although there are now long-term deals in place, I classify the temporary 
precursors to these deals as well as ongoing repeated short-term deals as long-term 
substitute transfers. 
3. Data Trends 
The following charts show three decades of average total transfer 
quantities (in acre-feet) in California, by category: 
  
 
IOU. Email with Steve Hirsch, Program Manager, Water Transfers and Exchanges, MWD (2010) (on 
file with author). 
 56. Environmental leases in the short-term category are included as they usually require some 
review and are often done for a market price. 
 57. Transactions, WATER STRATEGIST, July/Aug 1999, at 2 https://app.box.com/s/vmomssweb
20j125gjy2g2rsyo2nuh2wj. 
 58. In 2002, as part of the Quantification Settlement Agreement (QSA), MWD transferred 100,000 
acre-feet of it SWP entitlement to Desert WA and Coachella Valley WD. The recipients did not pay a 
premium for the water, but this transfer was unique and part of the broader QSA settlement. See 
HUNDLEY, supra note 26, at 299. 
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The quantity of water transferred on short-term basis climbs from about 
58,000 acre-feet in the 1980s to around 270,000 over the next two decades. The 
amount of water swapped short-term increases as well, climbing from 104,000 in 
the 1980s to 160,000 in the 2000s. Despite the increase, the short-term swap 
category is far less important today, accounting for only 22% compared to 43% in 
the 1980s and 31% in the 1990s. Long-term substitutes have increased over time 
too, from 20% to 29% of the market total. Long-term/permanent transfers have also 
grown in volume, accounting for 7% in the 1980s but 16% today. 
These charts only show annual averages for trades consummated in the 
periods listed. Long-term leases and permanent sales, however, imply obligations 
into the future. For example, because Metropolitan Water District signed a 35-year 
agreement with Imperial Irrigation District in 1988,59 the transfer only shows up in 
the long-term data in the 1980s, but IID transferred over 105,000 acre-feet to 
MWD in 2015.60 In the chart 4, I replicate chart 3 but also include water committed 
previously under a long-term agreement or from a permanent sale (the “Under-LT” 
segment).61 
By 2009, close to 700,000 acre-feet were delivered to users as a result of 
permanent contracts since the late 1970s. This figure represents an estimate of the 
amounts delivered under these contracts and leases. Closer to 1,400,000 acre-feet 
of water contract entitlements have actually been reallocated on paper since then, 
but annual fluctuations in supply dampen this figure. For the 2000s, these previous 
reallocations averaged 564,865 acre-feet, compared to 657,770 acre-feet transferred 
each year temporarily and 124,944 acre-feet in new long-term transfers.62 Between 
1998 and 2019, Californians used an average of 41,200,000 acre-feet of water, 
including 25,300,000 from surface supplies and 15,900,000 from groundwater. 
Agriculture used close to 80%. Therefore, using data from the 2000s, and including 
water transferred under previous deals, users transfer about 5% of surface water 
annually (1,347,579 acre-feet surface water transferred, 25,600,000 acre-feet total 
surface water use). More interesting than pure data trends are the stories behind the 
data, and the next section investigates where the marketed water actually comes 
from. 
II. WHERE’D YOU GET THAT WATER 
In almost every market, an owner must give up enjoyment of a good in 
order to sell it. Surprisingly, however, when it comes to water sales in California, 
this is actually rare. 
The water marketing literature typically mentions the benefits of 
reallocation, i.e., that water markets would: 
 
 59. The 35-year period actually begins in 1998 when MWD takes 106,110 acre-feet. See HADDAD, 
supra note 31, at 87. 
 60. IID/MWD Conservation, IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT, http://www.iid.com/water/water-
conservation/iid-mwd-conservation [https://perma.cc/2SFE-2ZWB]. 
 61. I had to assume amounts delivered under permanent CVP or SWP reallocations were equal to 
the contract amounts adjusted by the yearly Reclamation and DWR allocation percentages. 
 62. The numbers since 2009 are not much different. See HANAK & STRYJEWSKI, supra note 49, at 
19; Ellen Hanak & Jelena Jezdimirovic, California’s Water Market, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CALIFORNIA 
(2012), http://www.ppic.org/main/publication_show.asp?i=1177 [https://perma.cc/BHB5-LH75]. 
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 “facilitate the movement of water from low-value activities to higher-
value ones, thus resulting in a more efficient deployment of the 
resource”63; 
 “redistribute water to higher-valued uses”64; 
 encourage water to flow “to the highest bidders and ostensibly to ‘higher-
value uses’: specialty crops, industries, cities”65; and that 
 “[d]isparities of value in the use of a resource beckon calls for the 
reallocation of water from lower-value to higher-value activities through 
water marketing.”66 
 
While these quotes may describe water markets in some states, they do not 
accurately describe California’s water market. Most of California’s market activity 
is short-term in nature, not a permanent reallocation from one user to another. The 
majority of these short-term trades occur between agricultural districts within the 
CVP, and the vast majority of these transfers take place without one farmer using 
less so another can use more. The rest of the short-term market has a surprisingly 
similar characteristic—users temporarily buy water, but the water only occasionally 
leaves agriculture to support a higher valued use. And perhaps even more 
surprising, even long-term transfers in California frequently have this 
characteristic. Thus, water users get paid to transfer water without making much of 
a sacrifice. Instead, although districts expend effort to make water available, 
frequently this effort is not directed at making the farmers use less. Thus water 
markets—originally conceived as a way to move water away from low-value uses 
like desert alfalfa irrigation and into cities like Los Angeles—work instead by 
transferring water away from future wet years or from current environmental flows. 
Environmental groups see these transfers as a way of profiting off of public 
resources.67 As an economist, I see the benefits of these transactions, but the 
environmental groups have a point. The next four sections explain this through 
examples of each transfer category. 
A. Opportunity Cost of Short-Term Transfers 
1. Easy Short-Term Transfers (Swaps) 
“Easy” short-term transfers (swaps) are prevalent and useful, but they 
typically have very little impact on the selling district because the water made 
available implicitly comes from the ground. Most swaps occur within the Central 
Valley Project as transfers among contractors within the same geographic 
division.68 They occurred at least as far back as the 1970s,69 and these transfers do 
 
 63. Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. LAW REV. 1873, 1884 
(2005). 
 64. HADDAD, supra note 31, at xviii. 
 65. HUNDLEY, supra note 26, at 466. 
 66. Brewer et al., supra note 41, at 1022. 
 67. The California Water Impact Network is perhaps the most notable in crying foul. 
 68. There are also swaps within the State Water Project which have similar characteristics to what 
is described here. 
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not require individual environmental review.70 Instead, the Bureau of Reclamation 
(Reclamation) now publishes an Accelerated Water Transfer Program for each 
region granting five-year approval to all intra-division transfers that meet certain 
criteria. These environmental documents are revealing. They state that the land use 
changes from transferring are minimal because “[i]t is highly unlikely that a district 
would allow the transference of water out of their service area that could be put to 
the highest beneficial and economic use within the district.”71 In other words, 
districts are not transferring water that their farmers need, and the environmental 
documents confirm that “the Proposed Action would not result in any impacts to 
source districts, as the transfers and exchanges would be in response to climatic 
conditions, crop requirements, economics, or water delivery timing issues.”72 Other 
non-swap CVP transfers are similar.73 Therefore, if a CVP district sells water, it is 
likely that the district has more than it currently needs.74 
 
 69. GALE HEFFLER-SCOTT, HISTORICAL POLICIES GOVERNING THE TRANSFER OF CVP WATER 
(2007). For 1977 transfer volume, see U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, WATER OPERATIONS IN 1977—
THE SECOND DRY YEAR AND PRELIMINARY PLANS FOR 1978, at 22 (1977), http://cdm16658.contentdm.
oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p267501ccp2/id/3858/filename/3859.pdf [https://perma.cc/W256-
JDEM]. David Yardas claims these transfers have gone on between farmers “forever.” See THOMAS J. 
GRAFF, MALCA CHALL & DAVID R. YARDAS, THE PASSAGE OF THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT 
IMPROVEMENT ACT, 1991–1992: ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND PERSPECTIVE 63 (1996). 
 70. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL CVPIA ADMINISTRATIVE PROPOSAL ON WATER 
TRANSFERS (1998), http://www.usbr.gov/mp/cvpia/3405a/docs/ltr_final_proposal_water_trans_04-16-
98.pdf [https://perma.cc/VD48-T57J]. 
 71. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL EA, ACCELERATED WATER TRANSFERS AND 
EXCHANGES, CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT, SOUTH OF DELTA CONTRACTORS YEARS 2011–2015, at 16 
(2011) (emphasis added), http://www.usbr.gov/mp/nepa/documentShow.cfm?Doc_ID=7999 
[https://perma.cc/9QHG-EFLC]. 
 72. Id. at 17, 19. 
 73. A cursory glance at the Bureau’s environmental documents for recent transfers confirms this. 
For example, Clear Creek CSD seeks to transfer water whenever it can do so as long as its customers are 
not impacted. See CLEAR CREEK CMTY. SERV. DIST., CLEAR CREEK COMMUNITY SERVICES DISTRICT 
DROUGHT PLANNING AND WATER SHORTAGE POLICY 10 (2008), https://www.dropbox.com/s/jkz5mubi
myds99c/CCCSD%20-%20transfer%20discussion%20no%20impacts.pdf?dl=0 [https://perma.cc/EVE2-
57DN]. See also U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, MADERA ID ONE-YEAR TRANSFER TO NORTH KERN 
WATER STORAGE DISTRICT (2011), http://www.usbr.gov/mp/nepa/documentShow.cfm?Doc_ID=8318 
[https://perma.cc/Z7QV-SPWW]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, MERCY SPRINGS WATER DISTRICT 
AND FRESNO SLOUGH WATER DISTRICT MULTI-YEAR TRANSFERS TO ANGIOLA WATER DISTRICT—
DRAFT FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT (2012), http://www.usbr.gov/mp/nepa/documentShow.
cfm?Doc_ID=10210 [https://perma.cc/TN2C-FCWD]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL EA, 
TRANSFER OF CVP WATER FROM CENTRAL CALIFORNIA IRRIGATION DISTRICT OR FIREBAUGH CANAL 
WATER DISTRICT TO SAN LUIS, PANOCHE, DEL PUERTO, AND/OR WESTLANDS WATER DISTRICTS 11, 
29–30 (2012), http://www.usbr.gov/mp/nepa/documentShow.cfm?Doc_ID=10555 [https://perma.cc/
99GJ-KP4E]; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL EA, MAIN DOCUMENT AND APPENDIX A; ROOT 
CREEK WATER DISTRICT TRANSFER, EXCHANGE, AND TEMPORARY WATER SERVICE CONTRACT 11 
(2011), http://www.usbr.gov/mp/nepa/documentShow.cfm?Doc_ID=9042 [https://perma.cc/XB3D-
WDEJ]. 
 74. Many of these sales are not profit-making deals but rather efforts to comply with CVP 
scheduling rules and other contract provisions, and the hassle of the transfer can sometimes make the 
deal unattractive. Still, as D. Coxey of Bella Vista Water District told me, this option is better than 
relinquishing it to the USBR for redistribution. CVPIA eliminated the take-or-pay provision of contracts 
so Contractors only pay for water they receive. Thus it may seem easier to avoid the hassle of 
transferring it by relinquishing the water to Reclamation, but Coxey wanted to keep the water within the 
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Many of these sales are not profit-making deals, and the hassle of the 
transfer can sometimes make the deal unattractive. Because the Central Valley 
Project Improvement Act eliminated the “take-or-pay” provision of contracts so 
that contractors now only pay for water they receive,75 districts might be expected 
to simply relinquish their water that year and avoid the hassle of transferring it. 
But, there is a strong desire to keep the water “within the CVP family” and put it to 
beneficial use. This is chiefly because if it is not, the Bureau of Reclamation may 
cut a district’s contract amount upon contract renewal.76 
Reclamation’s contracting history is also relevant in understanding how 
districts are able to sell water. Reclamation originally intended that the CVP would 
supplement groundwater supplies for 2,000,000 acres, provide extra dry-year 
supply to 400,000 acres, and irrigate an additional 3,000,000 acres of new land.77 
Instead, the 5,400,000-acre projection turned out to be wildly optimistic. Today, the 
CVP irrigates about 3,000,000 acres, most of which were already irrigated.78 
Therefore, many farmers can survive (temporarily) with less surface water because 
they can turn to alternative sources. 
These facts provide insight into the opportunity cost of transferred water, 
i.e., what would have happened in the absence of the transfer. If a district does 
relinquish the water, rather than transfer it to another user, the Bureau of 
Reclamation can add it to the total supply available for other contractors. Because 
many districts have at least some farmers with groundwater supplies, increased 
Reclamation-contracted quantities mean less groundwater pumping, so transfers 
likely cause a slight increase in groundwater pumping. In other words, a district 
with excess water to sell actually sources that water from the aquifers of everyone 
else. If the aquifers recharge in wet years, then the opportunity cost to Californians 
of the transferred water is quite low—slightly less groundwater flows into rivers 
during wet periods. So no one gives up anything of value. 
2. Surface Storage Transfers 
The more difficult short-term transfers often take place without 
reallocation away from farmers as well. Instead, the water comes at the expense of 
Delta outflow in wet years. For example, in the summer of 2009, Oakdale and 
South San Joaquin Irrigation Districts (SSJID) sold 45,000 acre-feet of water to the 
San Luis and Delta Mendota Water Authority (mostly Westside CVP users) that 
was “surplus to the needs of their . . . water users” as a result of “changes in land 
 
CVP family and put it to beneficial use—if not, Reclamation may cut their contract amount upon 
contract renewal, or at least that is the worry. Telephone Interview with David Coxey, General Manager, 
Bella Vista Water District (2013). 
 75. CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1992, Pub. L. 102-575, § 3405(d)(4), 106 
Stat. 4706. 
 76. Telephone Interview with David Coxey, supra note 74. 
 77. Paul S. Taylor, Central Valley Project: Water and Land, 2 WEST. POLIT. Q. 228–53, 232 
(1949). 
 78. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, 2012 REPORT OF ACCOMPLISHMENTS, MID-PACIFIC REGION 
HIGHLIGHTS (2012), http://www.usbr.gov/mp/2012_accomp_rpt/mpr_highlights.html [https://perma.cc/
927Y-JWJP]. This of course calls into question the original value of the Reclamation Program and lends 
support to those who think it a massive giveaway to landowners at the time the projects were built. 
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use patterns, ongoing conservation measures, facility improvements, and other 
measures.”79 In other words, the farmers within the transferring districts did not 
alter their behavior to make this water available. The two districts have quantified 
rights to the Stanislaus River and are able to transfer excess. If Oakdale/SSJID did 
not transfer water, the water would remain behind New Melones dam in 2009 until 
it eventually spilled in a wet year, when the Delta would already be inundated with 
water.80 Thus, the opportunity cost of transferred water is once again very low. 
Merced Irrigation District (Merced) provides another example. In 2013, 
Merced transferred water to a wildlife refuge from its storage in Lake McClure on 
the Merced River. The order approving the transfer provides that “Merced will 
continue the same surface water deliveries to its existing customers with or without 
the proposed temporary water transfer.”81 In 2012, Merced transferred water to 
Westlands Water District, and as before, no one inside the district actually 
sacrificed any water.82 When Merced and others with storage replenish their 
reservoir in the future, transfer agreements stipulate refill criteria to prevent injury 
to the SWP and CVP, the parties largely responsible for Delta health.83 Therefore, 
the opportunity cost of transferred water is the value of additional water when 
Merced refills its reservoir, which occurs when water is relatively abundant. Thus, 
more efficient water use occurs as users with storage can more fully use their water 
rights and borrow and save across time. 
Yuba County Water Agency (YCWA) provides another major example of 
transfer without farmer sacrifice. YCWA built New Bullards Bar Reservoir in 
1970, capable of serving a much higher demand than existed within Yuba County 
at the time. Between 1987 and 2005, YCWA transferred 1,228,585 acre-feet from 
their new storage, the most from any single transferor over that time period.84 
YCWA continues transferring water under the Lower Yuba River Accord, a 
stakeholder agreement and guideline for the management of the Yuba river with 
 
 79. OAKDALE IRRIGATION DIST., WATER TRANSFER AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN OAKDALE 
IRRIGATION DISTRICT, SOUTH SAN JOAQUIN IRRIGATION DISTRICT AND THE SAN LUIS & DELTA 
MENDOTA WATER AUTHORITY (2009). 
 80. New Melones spilled water at least once in 4 of the past 13 years. CAL. DEP’T. OF WATER RES., 
New Melones Reservoir, CALIFORNIA DATA EXCHANGE CENTER (2011), http://cdec.water.ca.gov/
jspplot/jspPlotServlet.jsp?sensor_no=9177&end=02%2F01%2F2017+10%3A11&geom=huge&interval
=5000&cookies=CDEC01 [https://perma.cc/2DH9-D6NG]. 
 81. License 2685 (Application 1224) of Merced Irrigation District Petition for Temporary Change 
Involving the Transfer of 1,500 Acre-Feet of Water (Cal. Div. of Water Rights, 2013), 
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/applications/transfers_tu_orders 
/docs/a1224tempslnwr.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZPB5-88AF]. 
 82. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, WARREN ACT CONTRACT FOR MERCED IRRIGATION DISTRICT 
TRANSFER OF UP TO 10,000 ACRE-FEET TO WESTLANDS WATER DISTRICT FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT 
IMPACT, FONSI-11-073, at section 3.7 (2012), http://www.usbr.gov/mp/nepa/documentShow.cfm?
Doc_ID=11390 [https://perma.cc/7WYB-3UVP]. 
 83. In The Matter of License 2685 (Application 1224) of Merced Irrigation District (Cal. Div. of 
Water Rights, 2012), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/applications/
transfers_tu_orders/docs/mid_a001224_temp_order_oct2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/2J5A-C4EJ]. 
 84. Imperial Irrigation District comes close, agreeing to transfer 110,000 acre-feet every year for 35 
years to urban Los Angeles. DAMIAN BICKETT, WATER TRANSFER DATA SET, 1976–2010 (2010) (on 
file with author). 
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regard to fish, power, and irrigation/municipal use.85 The environmental 
documentation for the agreement specifically points out that past surface transfers 
are only carried out when deliveries to member units are almost sure to be 100%,86 
and that continued transfers are unlikely to trigger any significant land use change 
in agricultural acreage or substantial shift in crop patterns.87 Just like the other 
districts using storage, the transferred water has a very low opportunity cost—the 
Delta, in wet years, likely receives a little less when YCWA refills New Bullards 
Bar Reservoir. 
3. Groundwater Substitution 
The four districts mentioned above (Oakdale, SSJID, Merced, and 
YCWA) are illustrative of how water-rich districts with surface storage generate 
transfer water, but those with ample and resilient groundwater also may transfer 
surface water through groundwater substitution. These transfers require users to 
pump groundwater instead of using their normal surface supplies, in effect leaving 
more surface water in the system. For example, Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District 
(GCID) sold 4,400 acre-feet in 2013 through groundwater substitution to a 
consortium of users south of the Delta. GCID chose the wells involved in this 
transfer “such that the stream flow losses resulting from groundwater recharge peak 
during the wet season, when losses to stream flow should not affect other legal 
users of water.”88 YCWA also uses groundwater substitution transfers, transferring 
a total of 227,261 acre-feet in 1991, 1994, 2001, and 2002.89 YCWA’s groundwater 
levels rebounded quickly90 with limited impact on river flow.91 Thus, in both cases, 
the aquifer recharges when it rains, perhaps reducing river flow at that time, but 
recharge occurs in the winter, and thus the opportunity cost of the transferred water 
is once again very low. 
In the methods described so far, the Rule of Fallowed Fields applies: 
water transfers are not drying up California fields. It doesn’t always apply, as I 
show in the next section, but the evidence also shows that fallowing is becoming 
increasingly difficult to use to free up water. 
 
 85. YUBA CTY. WATER AGENCY, LOWER YUBA RIVER ACCORD - DOCUMENTS (2007), 
http://www.yubaaccordrmt.com/Yuba%20Accord%20Documents/Forms/AllItems.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/ZVB6-V6GD]. 
 86. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION ET AL., DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT/ 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE PROPOSED LOWER YUBA RIVER ACCORD 5-9 (2007), 
http://www.yubaaccordrmt.com/Yuba%20Accord%20Documents/Draft%20EIR-
EIS%20for%20the%20Proposed%20Lower%20Yuba%20River%20Accord/Chapters/Chapter%2005-
Surface%20Water%20Supply%20and%20Management.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2SN-LQHP]. 
 87. Id. at 16–10. 
 88. GLENN-COLUSA IRRIGATION. DIST., INITIAL STUDY AND PROPOSED NEGATIVE DECLARATION: 
GLENN-COLUSA IRRIGATION DISTRICT 2013 WATER TRANSFER TO SAN LUIS & DELTA-MENDOTA 
WATER AUTHORITY ch. 2, at 4 (2013) (on file with author). 
 89. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION ET AL., supra note 86, at § 5.1.3.5. 
 90. Id. at § 6.1.1.6, at 16. 
 91. Id. at § 6.2.6, at 71. 
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4. Fallowing 
Fallowing to free up transfer water occurs, but current DWR and 
Reclamation policy discourages the practice. Reservoir releases are preferred, 
followed by groundwater substitution, then crop substitution, and finally, crop 
idling.92 This is partly to avoid the social impacts of fallowing land and the 
environmental impacts on species that rely on watered fields. More importantly, the 
policy attempts to prevent giving transferors credit for making water available 
when they actually did not, creating a “paper water” transfer.93 California does not 
have a strong water use monitoring or water rights enforcement system in place,94 
which means that administrators lack precise knowledge about water consumption. 
Short-term transferors (non-swaps) typically sell water to thirstier southern buyers 
using SWP or CVP pumps in the Delta to move the water. If the CVP and SWP 
pump out additional water to facilitate a transfer and the transferor did not actually 
add additional water to the Sacramento River watershed, then, as noted before, 
SWP and CVP contractors bear this cost in future years while the transferor profits 
today. This is chiefly because SWP and CVP are responsible for the Delta’s water 
quality. Thus, the CVP and SWP have a strong incentive to eliminate paper water 
transfers. 
Although SWP and CVP set the rules for water transfer and potential 
transferors must acquiesce to their guidelines, currently, the rules disallow 
fallowing of pasture, grasses, and alfalfa grown in the Delta or in the foothills or 
mountain areas, orchard and vineyard crops, as well as other situations where 
estimating what would have happened in the absence of the transfer is too 
difficult.95 Even if allowed, the risk of a failed transfer is large.96 The SWP and 
CVP set the rules, and they err conservatively, much to the frustration of some 
users.97 
The effects of this evolving policy are evident in the history of DWR-
facilitated north-south water transfers. DWR operated water banks98 in the early 
1990s and dry-year purchase programs in 2001–2004 and 2009. In the 1991 Water 
Bank, 130,000 acres99 were fallowed, in sharp contrast to the less than 10,000 acres 
fallowed for the 1992 Water Bank.100 During the 2001-2003 dry-year purchase 
 
 92. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & CAL. DEP’T. OF WATER RES., ENVIRONMENTAL WATER 
ACCOUNT—DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT, at 22-5 
(2003), http://www.usbr.gov/mp/EWA/DraftEIS-EIR.html [https://perma.cc/8CD9-RSXH]. 
 93. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & CAL. DEP’T. OF WATER RES., DRAFT TECHNICAL 
INFORMATION FOR PREPARING WATER TRANSFER PROPOSALS (2013), http://www.water.ca.gov/water
transfers/docs/DTIWT_2014_Final_Draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/NW3B-8E3S]. 
 94. HANEMANN, ET AL., supra note 6, at 2. 
 95. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & CAL. DEP’T. OF WATER RES., supra note 93, at 17. 
 96. Id. at 4. 
 97. See MacArthur Ranch discussion infra pp. 34–35, 37–38. 
 98. A water bank is simply a state-run temporary transfer market where DWR acts as the middle 
man. 
 99. An additional 30,000 to 40,000 were denied irrigation after being planted. See GERALD L 
BOLES, CAL. DEP’T. OF WATER RES., DRAFT PROGRAM ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT: STATE 
DROUGHT WATER BANK 6 (1993), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/
bay_delta/wq_control_plans/1995wqcp/admin_records/part05/323.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JQM-HSRN]. 
 100. Id. at 7. 
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programs, DWR bought 172,211 acre-feet101, of which 28,109102 came from 
fallowing.103 In the 2009 Bank, 74,102 acre-feet were transferred, and at most 
21,000 came from fallowing or crop shifting.104 In addition, 200,000 additional 
acre-feet were transferred privately from north to south in 2009,105 the vast majority 
from storage releases. Fallowing does occur despite the bias against it, although it 
is temporary. 
There are three main areas in California that generate water from 
fallowing land: northern California rice farmers near the Sacramento River (e.g. 
Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District) and the Feather River (e.g. Western Canal Water 
District), San Joaquin River Exchange contractor106 (SJREC) land in Central 
California and Southern California alfalfa and hay farmers in the Palo Verde 
Irrigation District (PVID) along the Colorado River.107 The rice-growing districts 
have fallowed land occasionally since the first Drought Water Bank in 1991. The 
SJREC started fallowing some land in the early 2000s and will continue fallowing 
after solidifying a 2014–38 water transfer environmental analysis.108 PVID 
implemented a two-year land fallowing program in 1992, and then in 2004 signed a 
 
 101. WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY & WESTWATER RESEARCH LLC, ANALYSIS OF WATER 
BANKS IN THE WESTERN STATES 46, https://fortress.wa.gov/ecy/publications/publications/0411011.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ACC2-R23F]. 
 102. The Western Canal WD and Butte WD fallowed 28,109 acre-feet collectively. See 2 W. CANAL 
WATER DIST., FEATHER RIVER REGIONAL AGRICULTURAL WATER MANAGEMENT PLAN 2015 UPDATE, 
7–43, 
http://www.water.ca.gov/wateruseefficiency/sb7/docs/Western%20Canal%20WD%202015%20AWMP.
pdf [https://perma.cc/RL77-5JCY]; see also Transactions, WATER STRATEGIST, at June 2003. 
 103. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & CAL. DEP’T. OF WATER RES., supra note 92, ch. 6, at 82; 
WASH. ST. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY & WESTWATER RESEARCH LLC, supra note 101, at 46; WATER 
STRATEGIST, Nov. 2001, at 5. 
 104. See Heather Hacking, Few Sellers Lining up for Drought Water Bank, OROVILLEMR NEWS, 
Mar. 14, 2009, http://www.orovillemr.com/ci_11915996 [https://perma.cc/M4WU-PWRZ]; CAL. STATE 
WATER RES. CONTROL BD., WATER RIGHT ORDERS 2009, Order Nos. 2009-0040–20090048, 2009-0058 
(2009), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/board_decisions/adopted_orders/orders/
wro2009.shtml [https://perma.cc/9SZ5-JDVH]; DAMIAN BICKETT, WATER TRANSFER DATA SET, 1976–
2010 (2010). 
 105. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & CAL. DEP’T. OF WATER RES., 2010 WATER TRANSFERS 
PROGRAM SUMMARY (2010), http://www.water.ca.gov/watertransfers/docs/2010WaterTransfers
Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/HTA7-WP3S]. Most of this came from Yuba County Water Agency 
transfers under the Yuba Accord. 
 106. Four districts are included: Central California Irrigation District, Columbia Canal Company, 
San Luis Canal Company, and Firebaugh Canal Water District. 
 107. In addition to the areas mentioned, in 2016, Oakdale Irrigation District proposed a one-year, 
3,000-acre fallowing program to generate money for farm conservation projects and compliance with 
SB x7-7. The land would return to production the next year. See OAKDALE IRRIGATION DIST., CEQA 
INITIAL STUDY AND NOTICE OF INTENT TO ADOPT NEGATIVE DECLARATION (2016), ch.1, at 1, 
www.oakdaleirrigation.com/files/OID%20CEQA%20Initial%20Study%20OnFarmConsProgram.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2EVP-G9SL]. A dispute has the current program on hold. 
 108. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & SAN JOAQUIN RIVER EXCH. CONTRACTORS WATER AUTH., 
WATER TRANSFER PROGRAM FOR THE SAN JOAQUIN RIVER EXCHANGE CONTRACTORS WATER AUTH., 
2014–2038 FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT, NO. 
2011061057, ES-2 (2013), http://www.usbr.gov/mp/nepa/documentShow.cfm?Doc_ID=12130 
[https://perma.cc/ZVM4-WCZP]. The author of the Environmental Impact Report uses the terms 
‘settlement contractor’ and ‘exchange contractors’ interchangeably. 
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35-year deal that fallows land every year, which is unique. I provide more details 
on these fallowing programs in what follows. 
The San Joaquin River Exchange contractors (Exchange Contractors) own 
fantastic water rights. They exchanged their water rights along the San Joaquin 
River for replacement water from the Delta so the Bureau of Reclamation could 
complete the Friant Project upstream. The Exchange Contractors receive 840,000 
acre-feet each year to irrigate approximately 244,620 acres.109 They typically 
receive a 100% allocation, although in critical years (based on inflow into Lake 
Shasta), Reclamation may reduce their supply to 650,000 acre-feet. This has 
happened only six times since 1975, most recently in the consecutive years of 2014 
and 2015, when they actually received reduced allocations 65% and 75%, 
respectively.110 Because of the tremendous reliability, their water is valuable and 
they are active in the water transfer market, although fallowing has been rare. From 
2014–38, they are permitted to fallow up to 20,000 acres, as they were during the 
previous ten years. The most ever fallowed between 2005 and 2010, however, was 
3,342 acres, freeing up 8,132 acre-feet of water, with an average of 1,327 acres.111 
Their purpose of fallowing is also partly to address issues of poor quality 
groundwater in the region;112 but in general, despite the alfalfa and other low-value 
crops grown by the Exchange Contractors, removing productive land to free up 
transfer water is still rare and only done temporarily. 
In Northern California, many districts grow rice using water rights with a 
reliability similar to the rights of the Exchange Contractors. Both the CVP and 
SWP settled with the original farmers in the Sacramento Valley before they built 
their large dams on the Sacramento and Feather Rivers, respectively. These 
Settlement Contractors have secure and bountiful water rights, and many grow rice, 
a thirsty crop with an accepted evapotranspiration rate of 3.3 acre-feet per acre.113 
Farmers have fallowed rice fields with the intention of transferring the water saved 
since the 1991 Drought Water Bank, although the 130,000 acres fallowed is 
atypical. In 2014 and 2015, 146,145 and 132,042 acre-feet were made available 
from crop idling from roughly 44,000 and 40,000 acres, respectively. In 2014, the 
top six rice-growing counties harvested 411,200 acres with 2015 acreage just 
 
 109. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, SECOND AMENDED CONTRACT FOR EXCHANGE OF WATERS 
11, 15 (1967). 
 110. WESTLANDS WATER DIST., HISTORICAL CVP ALLOCATION (2016) 
http://www.usbr.gov/mp/cvo/vungvari/water_allocations_historical.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8GB-
KNZX]. 
 111. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & SAN JOAQUIN RIVER EXCH. CONTRACTORS WATER AUTH., 
No. 2003101106, FINAL EIS/EIR WATER TRANSFER PROGRAM FOR THE SAN JOAQUIN RIVER 
EXCHANGE CONTRACTORS WATER AUTHORITY 2005–2014, ES-6 (2004); U.S. BUREAU OF 
RECLAMATION & SAN JOAQUIN RIVER EXCH. CONTRACTORS WATER AUTH., SAN JOAQUIN RIVER 
EXCHANGE CONTRACTORS WATER AUTHORITY, 25 YEAR WATER TRANSFER PROGRAM WATER RES. 
ANALYSIS, app. b, at 27 (2012), https://www.usbr.gov/mp/nepa/documentShow.cfm?Doc_ID=9629 
[https://perma.cc/S6LE-PNT3]. 
 112. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & SAN JOAQUIN RIVER EXCH. CONTRACTORS WATER AUTH., 
GROUNDWATER CONDITIONS AND WATER TRANSFERS IN THE EXCHANGE CONTRACTOR’S SERVICE 
AREA WEST OF THE SAN JOAQUIN RIVER, app. d, https://www.usbr.gov/mp/nepa/documentShow.
cfm?Doc_ID=9631 [https://perma.cc/Y26N-SKL9]. 
 113. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & CAL. DEP’T. OF WATER RES., supra note 93, at 15. 
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slightly lower.114 Thus, in recent years, about ten percent of the rice fields generate 
water from fallowing. 
In addition to the usual antipathy towards fallowing, two endangered 
species make fallowing transfers even more difficult. The endangered giant garter 
snake likes artificial wetlands like rice fields. As a result, environmental 
restrictions now limit fallowing to maintain wetland habitat for the snake.115 
Endangered salmon also make fallowing costlier. Lake Shasta must release water in 
the spring for the fish, limiting farmers’ ability to store their water in Shasta in the 
event of a fallowing deal. Coupled with restrictions on Delta pumping, the window 
to move transfer water becomes increasingly short.116 
B. Opportunity Cost of Long-Term Transfers 
Long-term transfers, like short-term transfers, source their water typically 
without farmer sacrifice. East of Los Angeles in the Sonoran Desert, farmers in the 
Imperial Valley used up to one-fifth of the flow of the Colorado River.117 
Economists saw gains from trade – there had to be a better use of water than 
growing hay in the desert using water priced at $20 per acre-foot. Some called for 
transfers of up to a million acre-feet from Imperial to Los Angeles,118 but instead, 
in 1988, Imperial Irrigation District (IID) agreed to sell 100,000 acre-feet every 
year to Metropolitan Water District (MWD) for 35 years, a deal which was 
“exceedingly difficult to make happen.”119 Surprisingly, despite the attractiveness 
of moving water out of desert agriculture, Imperial farmers didn’t sacrifice water—
instead, MWD paid for conservation improvements to make Colorado River water 
available.120 In this case, the opportunity cost is less groundwater percolation and 
 
 114. See CAL. DEP’T. OF FOOD AND AGRIC., CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS REVIEW 2014–
2015, at 47 (2015) (the top six counties account for more than 90% of the total rice grown-in 2013, there 
were 528,900 acres), https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/statistics/PDFs/2015Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5LX-
K972]; U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CROP PRODUCTION: 2015 SUMMARY 26 (2016) (for 2015 acres), 
http://www.usda.gov/nass/PUBS/TODAYRPT/cropan16.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4NE-5U7M].; U.S. 
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & SAN LUIS & DELTA-MENDOTA WATER AUTH., DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT/INITIAL STUDY: 2014 SAN LUIS & DELTA MENDOTA WATER AUTHORITY WATER 
TRANSFERS, ch. 3, at 14 (2014) (for earlier acres planted), http://www.usbr.gov/mp/nepa/document
Show.cfm?Doc_ID=16824 [https://perma.cc/R72B-YDVQ]. 
 115. HANAK & STRYJEWSKI, supra note 49, at 18; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & CAL. DEP’T. 
OF WATER RES., supra note 93, at 22. 
 116. HANAK & STRYJEWSKI, supra note 49, at 24. 
 117. RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE 
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 142 (1989), https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=_V-
OAQAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=wahl+markets+for+deferal+water&ots=G2d-
K64GtD&sig=DDsmKA811_hb8j67pRCPTqqAkmI [https://perma.cc/ZHB2-QLZN]. 
 118. See generally H. J. Vaux Jr. & Richard E. Howitt, Managing Water Scarcity: An Evaluation of 
Interregional Transfers, 20 WATER RES. RES. 785 (1984); James C Dehaven & Jack Hirshleifer, 
Feather River Water for Southern California, 33 LAND ECON. 198, 204 (1957); R.N. STAVINS & ENVL. 
DEF. FUND, TRADING CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS FOR WATER: A PROPOSAL FOR THE 
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL COLORADO 
RIVER WATER BY FINANCING WATER CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS FOR THE IMPERIAL IRRIGATION 
DISTRICT (1983). 
 119. HADDAD, supra note 31, at 63, 79. 
 120. Id. at 88. 
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reduced runoff into the Salton Sea.121 Most of the groundwater in the Imperial 
Valley is not usable without treatment.122 Furthermore, excess surface runoff into 
the Salton Sea causes flooding (flooding being the original impetus for this 
transfer). Therefore, the opportunity cost of transferred water is likely quite low. 
Although some recent long-term transfers have been outgrowths of short-
term transfers, and thus have similar inconsequential effects on farmers,123 there 
have been long-term transfers and permanent contract reallocations within the SWP 
and CVP where farmers seem to actually give up water. In each case, the 
underlying water right is quantified, not in dispute, and the local groundwater is not 
a concern for neighbors. However, even in these cases, the water for sale is 
typically marketed after farming has stopped or is in the process of stopping. It 
remains difficult to transfer water by removing quality land from production. 
1. Permanent Contract Sales—SWP 
Although State Water Project Contractors (SWP Contractors) have some 
flexibility in disposing of excess supplies, they were mostly limited in their ability 
to move water amongst each other before 1994 because no clear guidelines existed 
and all transfers required DWR approval.124 The lack of a transfer policy, however, 
did not seem to upset the SWP Contractors, primarily because in the early decades 
of the project, most users were in their ramp-up phase. The contracts for these users 
were written with a steadily increasing allocation until they reached their maximum 
contract quantity. In addition, SWP contracts are “take-or-pay,” so the Contractor 
pays the fixed costs regardless of delivery amount.125 Because pumping water over 
the Tehachapi Mountains or to the Santa Barbara coast was expensive, urban users 
commonly refused portions of their entitlement even though they still paid the fixed 
cost associated with that water.126 Rather than using the cheap surface water to 
substitute for groundwater, farmers instead expanded acreage into new areas, thus 
growing dependent on this temporary surplus supply.127 As Metropolitan Water 
 
 121. STAVINS & ENVL DEF. FUND, supra note 118, at 124. 
 122. See OMAR J. LOELTZ ET AL., GEOHYDROLOGIC RECONNAISSANCE OF THE IMPERIAL VALLEY, 
CALIFORNIA K2 (1975) (for groundwater quality details), https://pubs.er.usgs.gov/publication/pp486K 
[https://perma.cc/HUN6-7APX]; CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA’S GROUNDWATER—
BULLETIN 118, UPDATE 2003, 28 (2003). 
 123. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 85, 106 (regarding environmental transfers from the 
San Joaquin Exchange Contractors and the Yuba River Accord). 
 124. See Madalene Mary Curie, A Distinct Policy Which Forms a Market Within the California State 
Water Project, 21 WATER RES. RES. 1718 (1985) (for a description of DWR’s transfer policy). DWR is 
still reticent to approve temporary transfers and instead presses for exchanges. 
 125. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT MONTEREY PLUS 3–2 
(2007), http://www.water.ca.gov/environmentalservices/docs/mntry_plus/DEIR%20-%20Volume%201/
03%20History%20Background.pdf [https://perma.cc/V9YW-68JM]. See article 33 and 21 or the 
original contracts. 
 126. MICHAEL STORPER & RICHARD WALKER , THE PRICE OF WATER: SURPLUS AND SUBSIDY IN 
THE CALIFORNIA STATE WATER PROJECT 21–22 (1984), http://geography.berkeley.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Walker_35.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YUL-9AWG]. 
 127. Id. at 11; HUNDLEY, supra note 26, at 297; MICHAEL STORPER & RICHARD WALKER, THE 
EXPANDING CALIFORNIA WATER SYSTEM, IN SAN FRANCISCO BAY, USE AND PROTECTION 181 
(William J. Kockelman ed. 1982), http://geography.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/
Walker_25.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QCN-GN7Y]. 
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District gradually increased their deliveries, the surplus dried up and was mostly 
gone after 1988.128 
The take-or-pay provisions also caused problems for agricultural users. 
The original contracts allowed for cuts of up to 50% for agricultural users before 
one drop was removed from an urban district.129 In the 1976–77 drought, SWP 
allocations to agricultural districts were reduced to 60%.130 In 1976, the SWP 
delivered close to 881,400 acre-feet to Kern County Water Agency (KCWA), the 
large wholesaler to the individual districts.131 In 1977, this number fell to 432,837 
acre-feet.132 Districts without groundwater were hit especially hard.133 KCWA’s 
Assistant General Manager described the situation as an imminent “economic death 
spiral.”134 
The farmers had difficulty making payments, and some chose to give up 
their land and let their SWP repayment obligations fall to their district. The most 
notable example occurred in Berrenda Mesa Water District (BMWD). In 1986, 
BMWD foreclosed on 6,500 acres and assumed the obligations for the land, 
prompting them to seek buyers for this extra SWP entitlement.135 Eventually, under 
the 1994 Monterey Agreement, SWP Contractors (including BMWD) were granted 
the right to sell 130,000 acre-feet of entitlement to urban agencies, and most 
consummated deals within the next decade.136 While these lands did lose their 
water supply, the Rule of Fallowed Fields still applies: the transfer itself was not 
the cause of the loss.137 
 
 128. HUNDLEY, supra note 26, at 299. 
 129. I. Fischhendler & D. Zilberman, Packaging Policies to Reform the Water Sector: The Case of 
the Central Valley Project Improvement Act, 41 WATER RES. RES. W07024, 1 (2005). 
 130. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., supra note 47, at 61. 
 131. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., THE CALIFORNIA STATE WATER PROJECT–1976 ACTIVITIES AND 
FUTURE MANAGEMENT PLANS, BULLETIN 132–77, at 52-3, (1977). 
 132. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., THE CALIFORNIA STATE WATER PROJECT–1977 ACTIVITIES AND 
FUTURE MANAGEMENT PLANS, BULLETIN 132–78, at 60-1 (1978). 
 133. This area includes some of Lost Hills WD and Wheeler Ridge-Maricopa WSD and most of 
Belridge WSD and Berrenda Mesa WD—a rough rule is everything to the west of the California 
Aqueduct. CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., PHASE I OF THE BAY-DELTA ESTUARY HEARING 
August 13, 1987 9AM (1987), http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/bay_delta/
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 134. Transcript of Record at 17, Planning and Conservation League v. Dep’t. of Water Res., No. 
200301118 (Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. February 3–13, 2003), http://www.water.ca.gov/environmental
services/mplus_transcript.cfm [https://perma.cc/S99E-VY6H]. 
 135. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., supra note 47, at 61; U.S. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 
31, at 225. 
 136. See CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., MANAGEMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA STATE WATER PROJECT, 
BULLETIN 13296, 11415 (1997) (for more details); CASTAIC LAKE WATER AGENCY, DRAFT 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT: SUPPLEMENTAL WATER PROJECT TRANSFER OF 41,000 ACRE-FEET 
OF STATE WATER PROJECT TABLE A AMOUNT 6–9 (2004), http://filecenter.santa-clarita.com/Planning/
HenryMayoAppendixDAppendices/Appendix%20D_Appendix%20q%20CLWA%20Supplimental%20
Water%20Transfer%20EIR.pdf [https://perma.cc/T35P-8WYM]. 
 137. Permanent water transfers, typically rare, occurred because districts within the SWP have 
quantified contracts, because after 1994 and the Monterey Agreement, Kern County Water Agency—the 
wholesaler—agreed that Berrenda Mesa and others had the right to sell, and because these west side 
districts didn’t use groundwater, a shared resource with correlative rights that often hinders surface 
transfers. 
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2. Permanent Contract Sales—CVP 
The Central Valley Project provides subsidized water to a diverse group of 
farmers, some of whom grow low-value crops and suffer from drainage problems. 
In the hopes of using water more efficiently and preventing new supply 
infrastructure, some began calling for allowing transfers of CVP water to non-CVP 
users. Among some proponents, the ideal transfer was to “put a farmer out of 
business on the west side and take his water supply.”138 In 1992, Congress enacted 
the Central Valley Project Improvement Act (CVPIA), a major reorganization of 
the CVP with an emphasis on facilitating water transfers from farmers and 
districts.139 Prior to the reorganization, CVP Contractors in the same division 
traded ample quantities of water on a short-term basis as that was the only available 
method of transfer for them at the time. But the CVPIA allowed transfers across 
divisions.140 More importantly, it allowed transfers to non-CVP Contractors and 
also granted individual farmers a limited right to transfer water without district 
approval, a “monumental change.”141 While a breakthrough on paper, actual 
behavior did not change much. No farmer was put out of business as a result of a 
water buyout, and of the few permanent transfers that have occurred, most have not 
led to fallowing productive land, but rather are a result of finding a home for water 
that is no longer needed. 
Between 2003 and 2006, a few small CVP districts sold their contracts to 
Westlands Water District and other nearby users. Westlands is a large agricultural 
district in constant need of additional water. Its selling districts had poor quality 
groundwater (like the SWP sellers above) and drainage problems and therefore 
were either in the process of curtailing irrigation or had done so already.142 
Although it’s hard to precisely identify the opportunity cost of the water, by the 
time they sold, the CVP districts were routinely temporarily transferring their 
supplies. And if instead left unused, Reclamation would reallocate these sellers’ 
water among the other contractors. Given that most CVP Contractors use 
groundwater to make up for deficiencies during dry periods, the marginal value of 
this water is likely very close to the capitalized value of reduced pumping costs 
resulting from leaving more water in the ground. As before, the Rule of Fallowed 
Fields applies: land removed from production is not the result of the transfer. 
The city of Tracy, a growing urban area surrounded by farmland, provides 
another example of a permanent CVP contract assignment without farmer sacrifice. 
The West Side Irrigation District (TWSID) and Banta-Carbona Irrigation District 
 
 138. CARL BORONKAY ET AL., THE PASSAGE OF THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT IMPROVEMENT 
ACT, 1991–1992: THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT PERSPECTIVE 134 (1997), 
http://www.archive.org/details/passagecentral00bororich (last visited Feb. 12, 2017). 
 139. D. E. Noll, Analysis of Central Valley Project Improvement Act, 3 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. 
REV. 3 (1993). 
 140. CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1992, § 3405 (a)(1)(M). 
 141. Id. at § 3405 (a)(1).; GRAFF, CHALL, & YARDAS, supra note 69, at 63. Similar state legislation 
granting this right to all California farmers failed earlier. Congress was able to pass this provision 
despite agricultural user objections. See Fischhendler & Zilberman, supra note 129, at 5. 
 142. Transactions, WATER STRATEGIST, March 2005, at 2–3; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, 
LONG-TERM CONTRACT RENEWAL- CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT. DELTA MENDOTA CANAL UNIT (2005), 
https://www.usbr.gov/mp/cvpia/3404c/env_docs/final_ea_fonsi/dmc/ [https://perma.cc/UWG8-A4LG]. 
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(BCID) sandwich the city of Tracy. In 2001, Tracy negotiated the assignment of 
10,000 acre-feet of TWSID’s contract and 5,000 acre-feet of BCID’s contract. 
Urban encroachment and other changes made water available (TWSID only 
irrigates 6,000 acres now compared to 10,800 in years past),143 and thus the transfer 
occurred after the land use changed.144The Rule of Fallowed Fields therefore 
applies here as well—despite wishes to the contrary, farmers are not permanently 
retiring farmland to sell their water. 
3. Colorado River – Sacrifice in the Desert 
Besides the MWD–IID transfer in 1987, two other transfers on the 
Colorado River are worth noting because they actually do involve farmer sacrifice. 
These are examples of some of the few transfers where the Rule of Fallowed Fields 
does not apply—the opportunity cost of transferred water is the farmer’s net benefit 
of using the water. 
In 1986, MWD began negotiating a fallowing transfer with Palo Verde 
Irrigation District (PVID), one of the oldest water users along the Colorado 
River.145 PVID is unique in California because, as MWD chief negotiator Tim 
Quinn said, 
More than probably any other place in California, the farmers out 
in the Palo Verde Irrigation District were willing to look at this as 
a business transaction. Generally water marketing . . . has got 
very strong emotional and social issues tied to it. Those didn’t 
tend to be attached to the issue as far as Palo Verde Irrigation 
District was concerned. They were willing to approach it as a 
business transaction.146 
Although interested in a 35-year deal, in 1992, they agreed to a two-year 
test transfer where farmers fallowed 20,215 acres, freeing up 4.6 acre-feet of water 
per acre of land for a two-year total of 185,978 acre-feet.147 Even though MWD 
stored this water in Lake Mead only to see it spill in 1993,148 it was successful 
enough to consummate a 35-year deal in 2004. Under this new deal, MWD may 
request that PVID farmers fallow up to 29% of the district’s acres per year, thus 
 
 143. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT LONG-TERM CONTRACT 
RENEWAL, ch. 3 at 3–22 (2005). 
 144. Sierra Club v. W. Side Irrigation Dist., 128 Cal.App.4th 690, 5–6 (Cal. App. Ct. 3rd 2005). 
 145. The transfer was an outgrowth of earlier negotiations in 1986–87 which stalled because of 
disagreements over price—MWD offered $135 per acre-foot, and PVID sought $300. See BORONKAY, 
ET AL., supra note 138, at 50–51. 
 146. Id. at 50. 
 147. METRO. WATER DIST., PALO VERDE TEST LAND FALLOWING PROGRAM, AUGUST 1, 1992–
JULY 31, 1994: FINAL REPORT i (1995), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/
programs/hearings/iid_sdcwa/pcl/exhibits/pcl_32.pdf [https://perma.cc/JW2M-VMDN]. 
 148. Interview with Gerald Davisson, General Manager of Palo Verde Irrigation District, in Blythe, 
Cal., 11 (Feb. 26, 2007), http://www.crwua.org/AboutUs/OralHistory.aspx [https://perma.cc/JC8Q-
K3YZ]; HADDAD, supra note 31, at 112. 
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making available to MWD up to 111,300 acre-feet.149 From 2005–10, Metropolitan 
bought 616,875 acre-feet of water that cost nearly $172 million.150 
Similar water right properties make this long-term transfer possible, as 
they have for the other permanent trades discussed. Palo Verde has very strong, 
undisputed rights to the Colorado River. The district can take as much as it needs to 
irrigate its 104,500 valley acres, and “no one’s rights are more generous or better 
positioned.”151 Individual rights are not quantified, but the Bureau of Reclamation 
tracks diversions and return flows, and thus tracks any difference in PVID’s 
consumptive use. And like the other permanent transfers, additional groundwater 
use does not cause jealousy. In PVID, groundwater in the district is ten feet from 
the surface, and is hydrologically connected and functionally no different than the 
Colorado River.152 Thus, groundwater and surface water are treated legally as the 
same source, a holistic approach absent in the rest of California. 
San Diego County Water Agency, a member of Metropolitan Water 
District, along with Coachella Valley Water District, also negotiated a 45-year 
transfer with Imperial Irrigation District that involves fallowing. Starting in 2003, 
IID would implement farm and other efficiency projects to make water available, 
but they would also allow fallowing, desirable because fallowing-generated water 
has less of an impact on the Salton Sea.153 The Imperial Board, however, was 
“fundamentally opposed to fallowing,”154 and although it compromised to make 
this deal happen, after 2017, the agreement eliminated fallowing as an option to 
make water available.155 Thus, once again, the district will return to the Rule of 
Fallowed Fields—after 2017, there may be empty fields, but they won’t be fallow 
 
 149. METRO. WATER DIST. & PALO VERDE IRRIGATION DIST., FORBEARANCE AND FALLOWING 
PROGRAM AGREEMENT 3.2.2.1 (2004), www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g4000/4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2005/
Agreements/MWDPVIDFallow.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV4B-L3SL]; Transactions, WATER STRATEGIST, 
July/Aug 2001, at 3. 
 150. METRO. WATER DIST., BOARD REPORT: 2008-2010 WATER TRANSFER AND EXCHANGE 
TRANSACTIONS Attachment 4, at 2 (2011), http://www.mwdh2o.com/PDFWWA2016Postings/2008_
2010%20Water%20Transfer%20and%20Exchange%20Transactions.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6FE-
JZFG]. Note: This amount does not include the additional 56,382 acre-feet requested during the dry 
years of 2009–2010 under a separate agreement. 
 151. HADDAD, supra note 31 at 72. 
 152. The only difference is the pumping cost, which makes it more expensive. As a result, only two 
farmers currently use groundwater—one grows 10 acres of peaches at the south end of the district on 
land not adjacent to a canal, and the other grows 31 acres of dates in the north end on land too high 
above his adjacent canal. Phone Conversation with Richard Gilmore, Assistant General Manager of Palo 
Verde Irrigation District (2016). 
 153. CAL. STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BD., IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT’S (IID) AND SAN 
DIEGO COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY’S (SDCWA) AMENDED JOINT PETITION FOR APPROVAL OF A 
LONG-TERM TRANSFER OF CONSERVED WATER FROM IID TO SDCWA AND TO CHANGE THE POINT OF 
DIVERSION, PLACE OF USE, AND PURPOSE OF USE UNDER PERMIT 7643 ISSUED ON APPLICATION 7482 
OF IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT 28 (2002), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/board_
decisions/adopted_orders/orders/2002/wro2002-13revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8JF-MVYC]. 
 154. IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIST., FALLOWING PROGRAMS IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT: 
FALLOWING, http://www.iid.com/water/water-conservation/fallowing [https://perma.cc/PNK3-LNDG]. 
 155. IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DIST. ET AL., QUANTIFICATION SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 36 (2003), 
http://www.sdcwa.org/sites/default/files/files/QSA_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/GT4B-P62U]. 
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as a result of water transfers. Fallowing remains “the f-word in California water 
marketing.”156 
III. WHY DOESN’T EVERYONE PARTICIPATE? 
Given that most transfers occur without farmer sacrifice, we should expect 
more users to take advantage of what appears to be a free lunch. However, not 
everyone can. In what follows, I focus on the dogs that didn’t bark,157 providing 
insight into how difficult water transfer reallocation can be as a result of vague 
water rights. 
A. McArthur Ranch 
Located north of Lake Shasta along the Fall River, George McArthur of 
McArthur Ranch proposed to sell a portion of his 60,000 acre-feet, pre-1914 direct-
diversion water right to San Joaquin Valley agricultural users. McArthur proposed 
to transfer water made available by fallowing irrigated pasture—he had no storage. 
Reclamation staff had concerns over the right’s validity as well as the quantity that 
McArthur was entitled to.158 Although he was able to sell during the 1991 Drought 
Water Bank, he has not been able to sell since then despite his strong desire to do 
so.159 Because the right is pre-1914, the SWRCB has no jurisdiction over the 
transfer, but the Reclamation and DWR fill the regulatory void because they are 
responsible for Delta water quality standards and have a strong interest in 
eliminating paper water transfers. Besides generally discouraging small transfers,160 
they make it very difficult to transfer water from irrigated pasture and alfalfa 
because of the difficulty in calculating evapotranspiration.161 In some cases, pasture 
may still grow without surface irrigation because it can acquire groundwater, thus 
making the calculation of evapotranspiration very difficult. 
 
 156. BORONKAY ET AL., supra note 138 at 52. 
    157.  These districts were unable to transfer and thus remained “silent.”  But the reasons why help 
explain transfer hindrances.    
 158. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., A CATALOG OF WATER TRANSFER PROPOSALS: DRAFT 12 (1986). 
 159. Interviews with George McArthur, Owner of McArthur Ranch (2011). The following 
description is based on my phone call with him as well. 
 160. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & CAL. DEP’T. OF WATER RES., DRAFT TECHNICAL 
INFORMATION FOR WATER TRANSFERS IN 2011, at 11 (2011), http://www.water.ca.gov/water
transfers/docs/TechInfoDoc-WaterTransfers-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN3S-LKLY]. 
 161. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION & CAL. DEP’T. OF WATER RES., INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO 
PARTIES INTERESTED IN MAKING WATER AVAILABLE FOR WATER TRANSFERS (2013); U.S. BUREAU OF 
RECLAMATION, 2010-2011 WATER TRANSFER PROGRAM—FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 2-9, 
2-10 (2010), https://www.usbr.gov/mp/nepa/documentShow.cfm?Doc_ID=5223 [https://perma.cc/
LMC6-JWCK]. This report from the USBR states “Only alfalfa grown north of the American River will 
be allowed in the 2010-2011 Water Transfer Program but fields must be completely disked under, or 
prior to, July 1 of transfer year. Alfalfa is not allowed if it is grown in the foothills, in the Delta, in areas 
with high water tables, or land irrigated with water that does not come from the Sacramento or Feather 
Rivers or their tributaries.” Id. According to George McArthur, this position results from their 
impression of the 1991 Drought Water Bank in that they paid Delta users to fallow irrigated pasture 
when the water availability in the ground likely meant that they did not get as much as they paid for. 
Interviews with George McArthur, supra note 159. 
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Pasture land is also typically marginal quality land, and may not be 
irrigated every year, making it difficult for the irrigator to prove to Reclamation 
and DWR that the land would be irrigated in the absence of the transfer. DWR and 
other state agencies are directed to “encourage voluntary transfers of water and 
water rights,”162 but they currently still prevent transfers from irrigated pasture and 
alfalfa even though those crops account for close to 432,000 acres in the 
Sacramento hydrologic region.163 For these and other reasons, McArthur remains 
frustrated.164 And while his frustration towards bureaucrats may be justified, his 
water right deserves blame too. It specifies a diversion season and an amount, in 
cubic feet per second, which he may divert; however, the right is silent on how 
much consumptive use he is entitled to. In addition, the amount of water he actually 
diverts has never been measured (although he does submit self-reported data as all 
water rights holders do). Further, because groundwater is not regulated, his ability 
to drill a well should he sell his surface right also complicates the situation. Thus, it 
is quite difficult to precisely say how much water McArthur uses and how much he 
would make available if he fallowed his pasture. 
B. AndCo 
During the 1977 drought, Anderson Farms Company (AndCo), an 11,335 
acre farming operation in Yolo County,165 desired to transfer its water to Berrenda 
Mesa Water District, an agricultural district in Kern County reliant on SWP water. 
Berrenda Mesa has poor quality or non-existent groundwater, and had 28,000 acres 
of permanent crops166 that were threatened by severe drought. AndCo had both 
riparian rights and groundwater rights, and it proposed to pump groundwater 
continuously and discharge it into Toe Drain, a tributary of the Delta and the source 
of their riparian surface water right. The SWP would pump additional water from 
the Delta to deliver it to Berrenda Mesa. For their own crops during the growing 
season, AndCo proposed to use groundwater, forgoing their normal riparian right 
diversions. Two main problems, however, characterized their proposed transfer. 
First, it would very likely be a paper water transfer. Second, its pumping would 
create a large cone of depression, sucking water from the hydrologically connected 
 
 162. CALIFORNIA WATER CODE, § 20200 (2007). Rice growers also have an incentive to prevent 
competition in the water transfer market, an important point according to McArthur. Interviews with 
George McArthur, supra note 159. 
 163. CAL. DEP’T. OF WATER RES., IRRIGATED CROP ACRES AND WATER USE—HYDROLOGIC 
REGION (2001), http://www.water.ca.gov/landwateruse/docs/annualdata/2001/Ag_HR_2001.xls.This 
number is for reference—not all of this is off-limits. 
 164. Frustrated is a nice term. He claims the folks in the Bureau of Reclamation and DWR he dealt 
with are “lazy middle management bureaucrats that don’t want to do any more than they have to” 
because they won’t make the effort to figure out how much water he is entitled to. Interviews with 
George McArthur, supra note 159. In addition, some of his water rights are in the adjudicated Cow 
Creek system. Because the decree does not make it clear if these rights may be transferred out of the 
area, DWR asked McArthur to get a judge’s opinion, but apparently, this has not happened yet. 
 165. Review of Proposed Groundwater Transfer Plan, Anderson Farms Co. v. County Of Yolo, 
Decision 1474, at 2 (Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 1977), http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water
rights/board_decisions/adopted_orders/decisions/d1450_d1499/wrd1474.pdf [https://perma.cc/83TU-
CMNP]. 
 166. Id. at 3. 
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Sacramento River, and therefore not add additional water to the system.167 In 
addition, AndCo’s riparian surface water right, which it would refrain from using to 
free up additional transfer water, likely would not have had nearly as much water 
available during the drought season.168 
The hydrologic connection with groundwater and the lack of 
quantification for both surface and groundwater rights thwarted this proposal. 
AndCo had two correlative rights—a shared riparian surface water right and a 
shared groundwater right—that were potentially transferable, but not without some 
effort on the farm’s part to estimate how much it was entitled to. AndCo’s riparian 
right might have had fresh water available during the 1977 season, but ex ante, 
there was no good way to tell, especially because the CVP and SWP release water 
to maintain Delta water quality standards. AndCo also did not have priority over 
other users sharing their water sources. It was permitted to use a correlative share 
of groundwater on their overlying land, but could only take surplus water to give to 
Berrenda Mesa. Again, calculating surplus water availability was practically 
impossible without a complete adjudication, which would be further hampered by 
the interconnectedness of the Sacramento River and the Yolo groundwater basin. 
C. Areias Dairy Farms 
The Central Valley Project Improvement Act granted individual farmers 
the right to transfer water without district approval. In 1993, Areias Dairy Farms, 
operated by Assemblyman Rusty Areias, first attempted to sell water to MWD to 
the south. The 2,800 acre farm was within Central California Irrigation District 
(CCID), one of the four San Joaquin River Exchange Contractors.169 MWD 
specifically targeted the San Joaquin Exchange Contractors because the water was 
reliable.170 Only four times in the past 36 years has it received less than a 100% 
allocation, and in those drought years, it still received 75%.171 The two parties 
agreed to a fifteen-year transfer where MWD would take Areias’ entire allotment in 
at least seven of the fifteen years.172 
Local farmers, irrigation district board members, and farming groups all 
denounced the deal, motivated in part by Areias’ hypocrisy, as he was formerly an 
 
 167. Id. at 7. 
 168. Id. 
 169. The Exchange Contractors exchanged their riparian and pre-1914 water rights to the San 
Joaquin River for supplies from the Delta. The USBR could then capture and export their old water 
supplies for use in the Friant-Kern Canal. 
 170. The water was also likely cheaper than from any regular CVP contractor. The CVPIA required 
transferors under certain circumstances to pay the full cost rate on the amount transferred. MWD would 
argue that this part of the act did not apply because the water was technically not Reclamation water but 
rather water diverted from the Exchange Contractors’ original rights on the San Joaquin River. 
Otherwise, USBR would require MWD to pay an additional $42 per acre-foot subsidy payback. See J.A. 
Savage, The Selling of Water, CALIFORNIA J., June 1, 1994. For subsidy repayment provisions. See M. 
Weinberg, Assessing a Policy Grab Bag: Federal Water Policy Reform, AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 541–56 
(2002). 
 171. WESTLANDS WATER DIST., supra note 110. 
 172. SMITH, supra note 48, at Oct. 93. 
214 NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL Vol. 57 
“arch-foe of water marketing” as a California legislator.173 Local meetings in 
August of 1994 drew standing room only crowds, with almost all present voicing 
opposition to the deal.174 Emotions ran very high—many gave arguments of a 
domino effect that if Areias sold, others would follow, creating a barren area with 
tumbleweeds just so Los Angeles residents could fill their swimming pools.175 
Neighboring farmers were worried about increased groundwater pumping, and 
despite assuring other farmers that no additional groundwater would be pumped 
and that the transfer money will be immediately invested in his struggling dairy,176 
the “overwhelming grassroots political opposition” never backed down.177 
These transfers are three prime examples of failed transfers.178 Besides 
physical constraints, three key points help explain why transfers are scuttled or 
hindered. First, quantified consumptive use is a prerequisite to transfer water. 
AndCo and MacArthur Ranch had no evidence on this front and this makes 
calculating transfer volumes impossible. Second, groundwater may be 
hydrologically connected to surface water. In this case, because California doesn’t 
regulate groundwater, transferring surface water may stoke fears of paper water 
transfers as it did with Rusty Areias’ deal with MWD. Third, economic concerns 
and jealousy matter, especially if a single farmer rather than a district proposes to 
sell water. Neighbors often worry about lost economic activity and the domino 
effect of many users selling. In addition, if a single farmer proposes a transfer, 
profits can make neighbors jealous. District-led transfers can at least spread the 
wealth around to ensure greater acceptance. Had Rusty Areias sold through his 
district instead, he may have been able to assuage neighbor fears by stating that no 
more than X % of district water would be sold. Metropolitan Water District, in 
working with Palo Verde Irrigation District, does exactly that.179 Instead, without 
district control, it seemed to neighboring farmers that anyone and everyone could 
sell if Areias was able to. 
While some of these fears are likely overblown, it may be rational to 
oppose transfers. Because farmers use so much more water than urban areas do, 
there is no threat of completely destroying irrigated agriculture. However, while 
urban water users are willing to pay high prices on the margin, a few consummated 
transfers could drive the price down significantly, thus lowering the value of the 
farmers’ water rights and perhaps making borrowing more costly. Thus, farmers 
 
 173. BORONKAY, ET AL., supra note 138, at 123; Elliot Diringer, San Jose Assemblyman to Profit 
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 179. METRO. WATER DIST. & PALO VERDE IRRIGATION DIST., supra note 149. 
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either want to be the first to sell, or they want to prevent their neighbors from 
selling.180 
In summary, in some cases water rights include the ability to sever water 
from the land; and because of the lack of quantification, the unregulated nature of 
groundwater pumping, and the political/economic transfer fears, too often farmers 
only have the ability to use water locally. 
IV. THE FUTURE 
It is difficult to forecast how water markets will look in the coming 
decades. However, it is clear that the desire for new supplies will not disappear—
the only question is where they will come from. North–South transfers will remain 
valuable, and East Bay MUD’s new Sacramento water supply infrastructure will 
enable north–south transfers that bypass DWR and Reclamation pumps, potentially 
easing transfers between the Bay Area and Northern California users. Although 
EBMUD did not include water transfers as a supply option in its 2005 Urban Water 
Management Plan,181 it did envision getting up to 13,000 acre-feet in their 2010 
Plan,182 evidence that it see the benefits too. In addition, EBMUD is pursuing a 
pilot transfer between Placer County WA and/or Yuba County WA to better 
understand the difficulty and cost.183 
The San Joaquin Exchange Contractors, as well as the other districts with 
lots of water in Central California, will continue to pursue transfers as well. Many 
have all been active in short-term markets, and some (including Oakdale and 
SSJID) have transferred long-term as well. California may have the “use it or lose 
it” doctrine on paper, but in reality, water users do not lose their water from a lack 
of use. They do, however, attract attention from other thirsty users who use the 
courts, and so it seems likely that these users will transfer more of their excess 
water to nearby thirsty areas to prevent mandated reallocation.184 
Water banking is likely to remain popular, as it allows managers more 
control than water marketing. Water banking allows users to smooth out 
consumption by renting space in non-adjacent groundwater aquifers, storing wet 
year water and then withdrawing that water in dry years. Water banking has grown 
markedly in recent years.185 
I also anticipate more joint action. Although there are hundreds of water 
districts, many have common interests and may band together to achieve common 
goals. For example, many agricultural districts band together based on common 
infrastructure (e.g., San Luis & Delta Mendota Water Authority). Bay Area urban 
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districts, dependent on Yosemite water, formed the Bay Area Water Supply & 
Conservation Agency (BAWSCA) in 2003. EBMUD and Contra Costa Water 
District, the large East Bay districts, have interties to share supplies, and EBMUD 
and BAWSCA joined together to pursue the pilot water transfer noted above. In the 
face of supply pressure, I suspect water managers will unite to share supplies. This 
could mean more joint water transfer proposals, and it also may mean more joint 
supply projects (e.g., desalination plants). 
CONCLUSION 
Are transfers described here good for California? Many of them involve 
users profiting from water that they have a right—but not a need—to use, and this 
seems unfair. But, the existence of trade means that both parties are benefiting, and 
although there are external costs, they are borne primarily by the Delta or 
groundwater aquifers in wet years when the opportunity cost of less water is very 
low. Thus, trading is likely to be efficient. Although most suppliers aren’t asking 
their customers to use any less, they are expending effort to make more water 
available as the price increases, and that is a good thing. 
On a more pessimistic note, legislation has unintended consequences, and 
we shouldn’t expect that water transfer legislation would be any different. Water 
users will game the system. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, legislators passed 
laws186 with the intention of more efficient water use, and while that may have 
occurred, users then wanted to claim credit for stuff they already were doing. They 
began to line canals, killing ditch phreatophytes, and switching irrigation methods, 
all in the name of conservation.187 These activities, however, hurt wildlife 
dependent on runoff. Thus, a consequence of transfer policy is environmentally 
costly water conservation. 
What to do then? It is tempting to conclude that policy makers should not 
worry so much about improving water marketing. This is chiefly because of the 
transaction costs inherent in water transfers, the antipathy in most of the state 
towards actually retiring land from agriculture to free up water, and the potential 
environmental damage from using water more efficiently. If a transfer truly 
represents a gain from trade from society’s perspective, it will happen eventually, 
as happened most notably with Palo Verde Irrigation District and MWD. However, 
this conclusion ignores the murky water right system at fault. Appropriative water 
rights in California are not quantified to a degree which allows administration 
during droughts. Correlative groundwater and riparian rights, as well as uncertain 
environmental constraints, further complicate the system.188 
Therefore, a more sensible approach might be to develop a better 
accounting system that takes into account the needs of the environment, and then 
allows users to trade once property rights are clear. California may get there, but 
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until it does, given the prevalence of alternative and often easier methods of 
reallocating water, we should not expect markets to play a significant role in 
reallocating water away from agriculture. 
